Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China

O’Brien, Kevin J.; Li, Lianjiang

doi:10.2307/422143

Cited by 452 publications

(195 citation statements)

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“…The reforms of both the "personnel control system" and the "cadre responsibility system" in the 1980s implicitly encouraged local leaders to pay more attention to economic growth. Specifically, they were encouraged to focus on the more-quantifiable and the more easily measurable projects, such as infrastructure development, in order to impress their superiors with measured economic performances (O'Brien and Li 1999). Thus, local Chinese leaders strategically increase aggregate expenditures during the third and fourth years of their tenure, at the moment when the upper-level party committees are about to reshuffle general personnel positions.…”

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confidence: 99%

Fiscal incentives and political budget cycles in China

Tsai

2016

Int Tax Public Finance

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Political budget cycles in democracies have been extensively analyzed, but few studies of non-democracies exist. This paper explores political budget cycles in China's provinces. Using data from Chinese provinces from 1980 to 2006, the analysis finds that the effects of a provincial leader's tenure on political budget cycles are minimal, implying a weak causal relationship between spending composition and a politician's time in office at the provincial level. However, there exists a national coordinated cycle associated with the timing of the National Congress of the Communist Party (NCCP). Two years prior to the NCCP, politicians are likely to shift public spending toward capital expenditures, such as innovation funds and capital construction, and away from current expenditures, such as agricultural subsidies. The opposite pattern occurs during the year of the NCCP, when politicians increase current expenditures, such as social expenditures and government administration, and decrease capital expenditures. The increased capital expenditures 2 years prior to the NCCP are accompanied by an increase in taxation and total aggregate spending. The empirical results indicate that provincial budget cycles are mainly driven by national policies rather than by provincial leaders' personal career incentives. Chinese leaders' fiscal behaviors are constrained by the dynamics of the national leadership transition, resulting in similar distortions to those found in the democratic countries.

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confidence: 99%

Fiscal incentives and political budget cycles in China

Tsai

2016

Int Tax Public Finance

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“…Under the current performance evaluation system, local leading cadres are held responsible for their accomplishments on a variety of targets. The problems of implementation are more easily understood if we examine them within the context of conflicting goals [1,4,11]. The evaluation scheme adopted by Xi'an City and Zhouzhi County clearly did not prioritize the work on building upright Party style and clean government.…”

Section: Implementation Hurdlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the third level, cadres are persuaded to correct their wrongdoing. 11 Although it is very difficult to differentiate among the three levels, the warning and criticizing system can play a part in helping to prevent corruption.…”

Section: Expunge Corruption From Cadres' Thoughtsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Old wine in new bottles: a county-level case study of anti-corruption reform in the People’s Republic of China

Chan

Gao

2008

Crime Law Soc Change

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This paper examines the role of the target-based responsibility system for building upright Party style and clean government in combating corruption in local China. It argues that the effectiveness of the target-based responsibility system in corruption control is compromised by a number of implementation hurdles in practice. Based on a close examination of one county, Shaanxi Province in the northwest China, this study shows that low measurability of the targets, the conflict between anti-corruption work and other evaluation targets, and the impact of patronage politics account for the implementation failure of the target-based responsibility system. The fundamental problem lies in that under China's unified cadre personnel management system, political will can interfere with the handling of corruption on a case-by-case basis, no matter what kind of anti-corruption mechanism is employed. Under this context, the adoption of the target-based responsibility system in fighting corruption results in nothing more than "pouring old wine into new bottles." Corruption, the "political cancer" of any regime, has become more rampant in contemporary China since the country embarked on a market-driven economic reform in the late 1970s [5,17]. The scope, magnitude, and characteristics of corruption in China have varied dramatically over time and in different places during the reform period. Yet a constant feature of the evolving phenomenon of corruption in today's China remains that a significant number of Party and state cadres at all levels seek to maximize their private Crime Law Soc Change (2008) 49:97-117

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“…8 For information about the 2000 and 2004 surveys, see Appendix 1. every three to five years. This is called the Cadre Exchange system [33,15]. If the county party secretary cannot maintain social stability then they will lose their opportunity for promotion or worse.…”

Section: Supply Side: Regulations and Relationshipsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply and Support for Grassroots Political Reform in Rural China

Kennedy

2010

J OF CHIN POLIT SCI

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Evidence suggests that the quality of grassroots political reform varies throughout rural China from fair elections to electoral manipulation. This reflects an uneven supply of reforms. However, top-down implementation is not a complete measure of success when it comes to the introduction of grassroots reform. Rural folks are good judges of institutional qualities, such as procedural fairness. It is their attitudes that are associated with the support for democracy. This is called the supply and support model. I modify and apply this model to rural China, and show that support for democratic institutions and ideals can develop within an authoritarian regime such as the People's Republic of China.

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Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China

Cited by 452 publications

References 0 publications

Fiscal incentives and political budget cycles in China

Fiscal incentives and political budget cycles in China

Old wine in new bottles: a county-level case study of anti-corruption reform in the People’s Republic of China

Supply and Support for Grassroots Political Reform in Rural China

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