2010
DOI: 10.1007/s11366-010-9096-0
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Supply and Support for Grassroots Political Reform in Rural China

Abstract: Evidence suggests that the quality of grassroots political reform varies throughout rural China from fair elections to electoral manipulation. This reflects an uneven supply of reforms. However, top-down implementation is not a complete measure of success when it comes to the introduction of grassroots reform. Rural folks are good judges of institutional qualities, such as procedural fairness. It is their attitudes that are associated with the support for democracy. This is called the supply and support model.… Show more

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Cited by 9 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…In post-authoritarian regimes, the performance of institutions is vital “inasmuch as citizens can assess it by comparison with a predecessor regime” (Rose and Mishler, 2011: 120). Citizens are likely to value political institutions that perform consistently and hence will be perceived as trustworthy (Kennedy, 2010; Rose and Mishler, 2011).…”
Section: Measuring Institutional Trustmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In post-authoritarian regimes, the performance of institutions is vital “inasmuch as citizens can assess it by comparison with a predecessor regime” (Rose and Mishler, 2011: 120). Citizens are likely to value political institutions that perform consistently and hence will be perceived as trustworthy (Kennedy, 2010; Rose and Mishler, 2011).…”
Section: Measuring Institutional Trustmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In an authoritarian state like China, opening up elections in rural areas are likely to be regarded as a "gift" from the central government, which in return wins ruling legitimacy for the CCP. For instance, Kennedy suggests that the CCP offers political rights to vote as a bargain for social stability [30]. Similarly, Wilking and Zhang also argue that the Chinese government offers political rights to impoverished regions as compensation to their economic dissatisfaction [31].…”
Section: Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When promoting the non-agricultural employment of rural labor, the high cost "bottleneck" of agricultural production cost caused by imperfect transportation facilities is resolved. In order to ensure increased investments in transportation infrastructures, the government departments could increase the budgetary funds, and appropriately guide private capital [20].…”
Section: Research Conclusionmentioning
confidence: 99%