2013
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2213119
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Self Attribution Bias of the CEO: Evidence from CEO Interviews on CNBC

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Cited by 10 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Kruger (1999) claims that overconfidence occurs when individuals think of themselves as "above average," which affects individual behavior in three ways: overestimation, overprecision, and overplacement. Kim (2013) emphasizes that self-attribution is an important conduit that abets overconfidence by attributing their successes to internal factors, such as personal abilities and their failures to external factors. Furthermore, overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate their firms' resource endowments and outcomes under their control (Malmendier & Tate, 2005).…”
Section: Theoretical Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Kruger (1999) claims that overconfidence occurs when individuals think of themselves as "above average," which affects individual behavior in three ways: overestimation, overprecision, and overplacement. Kim (2013) emphasizes that self-attribution is an important conduit that abets overconfidence by attributing their successes to internal factors, such as personal abilities and their failures to external factors. Furthermore, overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate their firms' resource endowments and outcomes under their control (Malmendier & Tate, 2005).…”
Section: Theoretical Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In contrast, we investigate comprehensive aspects of firm risk in a coherent manner: total risk, idiosyncratic risk (Supporting Information), financial risk, M&A, and the sensitivity of CEO compensation upon firm risk. We also link fWHR to various aspects of M&A (Doukas & Petmezas, ; Kim, ; Malmendier & Tate, ; Roll, ), such as the frequency, the dollar amount spent on acquisitions, merger premium, and investor response to acquisition announcements. In addition, we use various alternative measures of fWHR, such as the dummy variable for being in the widest tercile of fWHR.…”
Section: Development Of Hypotheses and Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The board is expected to remove CEOs who are believed to be poorly managing the company, judged in part on the basis of firm financial performance (Weisbach, 1988) but also in accordance with other social and political factors (Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988). More recently, scholars have focused on actions the CEO can take to alter the likelihood of dismissal (e.g., the CEO using self-attribution bias in discussing the company's performance; Kim, 2013). As we have explained, greed and altruism have various effects on the time orientation of decisions and other firm outcomes.…”
Section: Corporate Malfeasance and Corporate Citizenship Greedymentioning
confidence: 99%