This paper challenges the prevalent notion that family-owned firms are more risk averse than publicly owned firms. Using behavioral theory, we argue that for family firms, the primary reference point is the loss of their socioemotional wealth, and to avoid those losses, family firms are willing to accept a significant risk to their performance; yet at the same time, they avoid risky business decisions that might aggravate that risk. Thus, we propose that the predictions of behavioral theory differ depending on family ownership. We confirm our hypotheses using a population of 1,237 family-owned olive oil mills in Southern Spain who faced the choice during a 54-year period of becoming a member of a cooperative, a decision associated with loss of family control but lower business risk, or remaining independent, which preserves the family's socioemotional wealth but greatly increases its performance hazard. As shown in this study, family firms may be risk willing and risk averse at the same time.

We develop the construct of board capital, composed of the breadth and depth of directors' human and social capital, and explore how board capital affects strategic change. Building upon resource dependence theory, we submit that board capital breadth leads to more strategic change, while board capital depth leads to less. We also recognize CEO power as a moderator of these relationships. Our hypotheses are tested using a random sample of firms on the S&P 500. We find support for the effect of board capital on strategic change, and partial support for the moderating effect of CEO power. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The answer to many strategic management research questions is often summarized as "It depends." Faced with the marginal results of many main effect hypothesis tests of one variable on another variable, strategy researchers began developing contingency hypotheses that explored more nuanced relationships involving multiple variables. Herein, the authors examine the development of contingency thinking in strategic management via a review of all empirical articles published in Strategic Management Journal from its inception in 1980 through 2009. Using Venkatraman's framework, they identify all contingency studies within this sample. Their analysis reveals that, while contingency hypotheses are becoming more common, there is less diversity in the way the effects are tested. Additionally, while the framing of contingency hypotheses has become more sophisticated over time, there remain many opportunities for methodological improvements. Based on this content analysis, the authors offer both theoretical and methodological guidelines for future strategic management studies.

Interactions between CEOs and their boards of directors are a prominent focus of management and strategy research. Despite the extensive literature on CEO-board relations, to date there has been limited integration of theoretical perspectives and measurement schemes. Through an extensive analysis of published studies, we hope to facilitate future research on CEO-board relations. We begin with a comparison of key theoretical approaches. Next, we conduct a content analysis of 51 empirical articles. We find that prior studies have an unbalanced focus regarding both topics and theoretical perspectives, and that there is limited consistency in the choice of measures. Based on this review, we lay out a number of promising directions for future research. We also find that, while there has been progress in international research on CEO-board relations, there are still many unanswered questions regarding the generalizability of governance theories across different geographic settings.