c Several studies have addressed the CEO duality-performance relationship, with inconsistent results. This paper proposes that these inconsistencies can be resolved by integrating agency and stewardship perspectives on duality. Using data from 192 firms in 12 industries, both the direction and magnitude of the duality-performance relationship was found to vary systematically across Dess and Beard's (1984) environmental dimensions. These results provide partial support for both agency and stewardship perspectives. LITERATURE REVIEW 'AND HYPOTHESESThere has been extensive debate in both academic and practitioner forums over the effect of CEO duality on firm performance. Duality offers the clear direction of a single leader, and a concomitantly faster response to external events. As with other insider-directors, the CEO-chair would be expected to have a greater knowledge of the firm and its industry, and have greater commitment to the organization than an external chair. Evidence positively linking insider board representation to performance (e.g., Cochran, Wood, and Jones, 1985;Vance, 1964) is cited to support this form of governance. Proponents of duality also characterize the board chair position

Two competing models of corporate boards are presented. Management control proposesthat the board is a rubber stamp for management, and plays a minor role in strategic management, while resource dependence asserts that the board is a tool used to manage environmental uncertainty. A structural model was developed to determine whether corporate boards respond to different types of environmental uncertainty, using data on 147 companies from nine industry groups. It was found that boards tended to be smaller in a more uncertain environment, while having an increased number of interlocks. This relationship was stronger in high-performing firms.

The board of directors has been identified as a key internal control mechanism for setting CEO compensation. Theory suggests that CEOs will attempt to circumvent board control in an effort to maximize salary. This hypothesis was tested using a sample of 193 firms in a cross-section of industries. Corporate governance literature was reviewed to develop a multiple indicator measure of board control. Although, as hypothesized, CEO salaries were greater in firms with lower levels of control, CEO compensation was not significantly related to firm size or profitability.Research on executive Compensation has only recently extended to the field of strategic manageccc 014~2095/94/05033~10

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This paper demonstrates how meta-analysis can be combined with structural equation modeling (MASEM) to address new questions in strategic management research. We review this integration, describe its implementation, and compare findings from bivariate meta-analyses, a direct-effect structural equations model, and two mediating frameworks using data on the strategic leadership and performance relationship. Results drawn from 208 articles that collectively included data on 495,638 observations demonstrate the new insights available from MASEM while also suggesting a revision to conventional thinking on strategic leadership. Whereas some theories posit that boards of directors influence firm performance through monitoring and disciplining the top management team, MASEM provides more support for the view that boards mediate the top management teams' decisions. Implications for applying MASEM in strategic management are offered.As the strategic management field matures, scholars are increasingly using meta-analysis to synthesize prior work on many topics, including the perfor-