Self-Enhancement: Food for Thought

Sedikides, Constantine; Gregg, Aiden P.

doi:10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00068.x

Cited by 673 publications

(527 citation statements)

References 199 publications

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“…In contrast, people who are low in intellectual humility have a lower tolerance for ambiguity (Leary et al, 2016), which may motivate them to avoid information that might raise questions about their existing viewpoints. Low intellectual humility is also associated with the tendency to be threatened by what one doesn't know (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016) and with the motive to defend one's ego in the face of ignorance, errors, disagreements, and other signs of one's intellectual shortcomings (Gregg, Sedikides, & Gebauer, 2011;Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). In contrast, people high in intellectual humility indicate that they enjoy finding out new information that differs from what they already think is true (Leary et al, 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Knowing what you know: Intellectual humility and judgments of recognition memory

Deffler

Leary

Hoyle

2016

Personality and Individual Differences

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This study examined the relationship between recognition memory and intellectual humility, the degree to which people recognize that their personal beliefs are fallible. Participants completed the General Intellectual Humility Scale, an incidental old/new recognition task, and a task that assessed the tendency to over-claim one's knowledge. Signal detection analyses showed that higher intellectual humility was associated with higher discriminability between old and new items, regardless of whether the items were congruent or incongruent with participants' own beliefs. However, intellectual humility was not related to response bias, indicating that intellectually arrogant people were not biased to claim that they knew everything. Together, the findings support a relationship between intellectual humility and performance on memory tasks, indicating that individual differences in intellectual humility may partly reflect how people process information and judge what they do and do not know.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Knowing what you know: Intellectual humility and judgments of recognition memory

Deffler

Leary

Hoyle

2016

Personality and Individual Differences

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“…That work has shown that believing in oneself simply feels good (Marshall & Brown, 2008;Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). For example, self-confidence can improve self-esteem (Alicke, 1985), mental health (Taylor & Brown, 1988), and task motivation and persistence (Pajares, 1996).…”

Section: The Origins Of Overconfidencementioning

confidence: 99%

When overconfidence is revealed to others: Testing the status-enhancement theory of overconfidence

Kennedy

Anderson

Moore

2013

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

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101

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“…We are biased toward self-enhancement and justify our beliefs and actions-even altruistic action-in terms of self-interest, (Miller, 1999). Even beyond the "better-than-average" effect, our thinking is biased toward the self in comparison to others (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). This is not mere egoism, for while we tend to think of ourselves as "better than average," we can also think of ourselves as below average in comparison to others (Kruger, 1999).…”

Section: §322 Accuracy and Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology

Samuelson¹,

Church

2014

Philosophical Psychology

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In this paper we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions-agent-reliabilism and agentresponsibilism (or neo-Aristotelianism)-as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type 1, or the improper function of Type 2 cognitive processes. By the same token, the proper intervention of Type 2 processes results in the virtuous functioning of our cognitive systems (agent-reliabilism). Moreover, the role of motivation in attenuating cognitive biases and the cultivation of certain epistemic habits (a search for accuracy, being accountable for one's judgments, the use of rules of analysis, and exposure to differing perspectives) points to the tenets of agent-responsibilism in epistemic virtue. We identify the proper use of Type 2 cognitive processes and the habits of mind that attenuate biases as demonstrations of the virtue of intellectual humility. We briefly explore the nature of these habits and the contribution of personality traits, situational pressures, and training in their cultivation. §1. IntroductionAny account of knowing has, as its starting point, the capacity and desire to know the "truth," through whatever normative criteria the "truth" can be established. Yet, human beings are notoriously (and apparently naturally) disposed to over-estimate their capacity to know the truth and under-estimate their weaknesses (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996;Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995;Evans, 2007; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002;Kunda, 1990;Pronin, Berger, & Molouki, 2007;Stanovich & West, 1997;Wegener & Petty, 1997). Indeed, the evidence is clear that there is a strong tendency even to under-estimate our liability to such biases (Pronin & Kugler, 2007)! Furthermore, we are susceptible to all sorts of biases that make knowing difficult. For example, we tend to favor evidence or data received early in our inquiries (Kruglanski, Dechesne, Orehek, & Pierro, 2009) and we tend to discount the weight of evidence that counts against hypotheses we endorse (Nickerson, 1998). Second, evolutionary psychologists have offered some intriguing arguments that these dispositions are embedded within our cognitive architecture in ways that can systematically lead us to biased thinking, in some cases for adaptive reasons (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Our intention here is to apply some principles and distinctions from virtue epistemology to the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases to gain a better understanding of the promise and perils of our cognitive systems. We will examine questions of how and under what circumstances these heuristics and biases can be characterized as epistemic vices and how the specific epistemic virtue of intellectual humility may help mitigate these vi...

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Self-Enhancement: Food for Thought

Cited by 673 publications

References 199 publications

Knowing what you know: Intellectual humility and judgments of recognition memory

Knowing what you know: Intellectual humility and judgments of recognition memory

When overconfidence is revealed to others: Testing the status-enhancement theory of overconfidence

When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology

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