Self‐Regulation and Developmental Psychopathology: Experiential Canalization of Brain and Behavior

Abstract

We use principles of developmental science and the concept of experiential canalization as a lens through which to view the development of self‐regulation in childhood and risk for the development of psychopathology. Problems with the regulation of emotion, attention, the stress response, and executive functions are characteristic of many psychiatric disorders. Experiential canalization provides a framework within which to examine interactions among processes of self‐regulation across multiple levels of analysis from the genetic to the social and cultural. A focus on self‐regulation illuminates a developmental analysis of risk for psychopathology and also processes of resilience in response to risk. We review the historical understanding of experiential canalization in the scientific literature, examining its initial representation through to its manifestation in current thinking about processes of epigenesis. We then present a comprehensive model of self‐regulation and apply it to research literatures on the development of depression, anxiety, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and schizophrenia. In keeping with central concepts in developmental science, we highlight the ways that self‐regulation can best be understood in terms of reciprocal interactions among genetic, physiological, perceptual, cognitive, affective, behavioral and social‐cultural processes and consider the ways in which behavior plays a central organizing role in development with implications for both stability and change. We conclude with an examination of resilience as an instance of the experiential canalization of self‐regulation and resulting considerations for prevention and intervention.

Annual Research Review: On the relations among self‐regulation, self‐control, executive functioning, effortful control, cognitive control, impulsivity, risk‐taking, and inhibition for developmental psychopathology

“…Thus, although some definitions of ‘SR’ are domain‐specific (either distinguishing it from, or else equating it with, regulation of emotion) or narrow (limiting to overcoming temptation), and while it remains important to distinguish SR from the metaskills or component processes that enable it, it is most helpful to treat ‘SR ’ as broader and domain‐general (Bell & Calkins, ; Blair, Raver, & Finegood, ; Karoly, ). We can then use specific terms to designate SR of emotion, action, or cognition .…”

“…It has accrued a welter of overlapping definitions, as reviewed by Barkley (). Contemporary definitions describe (a) a set of at least partially independent top‐down functions that support goal‐directed action (Banich, ; Blair et al., ; Diamond, ; Friedman & Miyake, ; Miyake et al., ); or in a computational context, rule‐governed behavior (guided by internal goals or rules rather than by external stimuli; Verbruggen et al., ); and (b) complex cognition including manipulating two things in mind at once, reasoning, temporal projection, and complex mental and action sequences (Barkley, ; Diamond, ). EF is invoked when automatized routines will not work or are not possible (e.g.…”

Leveraging translational neuroscience to inform early intervention and addiction prevention for children exposed to early life stress

“…A wide body of literature has demonstrated associations between ELS and poor executive function ( Pechtel and Pizzagalli, 2011 ). ELS-exposed children may have altered executive function for a multitude of reasons, including lower caregiver scaffolding of complex skills, less consistent monitoring and reinforcement of self-regulatory skills, and the vulnerability of key prefrontal brain regions to excessive cortisol exposure ( Blair et al, 2016 ).…”

Specificity of executive functioning and processing speed problems in common psychopathology.

“…It has accrued a welter of overlapping definitions, as recently reviewed by Barkley (Barkley, 2012). Contemporary definitions emphasize a set of at least partially independent top-down functions that support goal-directed action (Marie T. Banich, 2009; Blair, Raver, & Finegood, 2016; Diamond, 2013; Friedman & Miyake, 2016; Miyake et al, 2000) as well as complex cognition (Barkley, 1997; Diamond, 2013). EF are invoked when automatized routines will not work or are not possible (e.g., novel situations).…”