Self‐Representation and Perspectives in Dreams

Rosen, Melanie; Sutton, John

doi:10.1111/phc3.12082

Cited by 31 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…15For a discussion of shifting perspectives in dreams, see Rosen and Sutton (2013) forthcoming in Philosophy Compass.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

What I make up when I wake up: anti-experience views and narrative fabrication of dreams

Rosen

2013

Front. Psychol.

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I propose a narrative fabrication thesis of dream reports, according to which dream reports are often not accurate representations of experiences that occur during sleep. I begin with an overview of anti-experience theses of Norman Malcolm and Daniel Dennett who reject the received view of dreams, that dreams are experiences we have during sleep which are reported upon waking. Although rejection of the first claim of the received view, that dreams are experiences that occur during sleep, is implausible, I evaluate in more detail the second assumption of the received view, that dream reports are generally accurate. I then propose a “narrative fabrication” view of dreams as an alternative to the received view. Dream reports are often confabulated or fabricated because of poor memory, bizarre dream content, and cognitive deficits. It is well documented that narratives can be altered between initial rapid eye movement sleep awakenings and subsequent reports. I argue that we have reason to suspect that initial reports are prone to inaccuracy. Experiments demonstrate that subjects rationalize strange elements in narratives, leaving out supernatural or bizarre components when reporting waking memories of stories. Inaccuracies in dream reports are exacerbated by rapid memory loss and bizarre dream content. Waking memory is a process of reconstruction and blending of elements, but unlike waking memory, we cannot reality-test for dream memories. Dream experiences involve imaginative elements, and dream content cannot be verified with external evidence. Some dreams may involve wake-like higher cognitive functions, such as lucid dreams. Such dreams are more likely to elicit accurate reports than cognitively deficient dreams. However, dream reports are generally less accurate than waking reports. I then propose methods which could verify the narrative fabrication view, and argue that although the theory cannot be tested with current methods, new techniques and technologies may be able to do so in the future.

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“…15For a discussion of shifting perspectives in dreams, see Rosen and Sutton (2013) forthcoming in Philosophy Compass.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

What I make up when I wake up: anti-experience views and narrative fabrication of dreams

Rosen

2013

Front. Psychol.

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“…Here, one can ask what are the typical characteristics of self‐experience in dreams and how (if at all) they differ from waking (Revonsuo, ); or one can investigate the variability of self‐experience within dreams and attempt to identify the minimal conditions for its emergence (Windt, ,b; Windt, ). Vicarious dreams, in which we dream of being a different person (such as a fictional or historical character), are an interesting in‐between example (Rosen & Sutton, ).…”

Section: Simulation and Beyond: From Dreaming To Dreamless Sleep Expementioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness in sleep: How findings from sleep and dream research challenge our understanding of sleep, waking, and consciousness

Windt

2020

Philosophy Compass

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Sleep is phenomenologically rich, teeming with different kinds of conscious thought and experience. Dreaming is the most prominent example, but there is more to conscious experience in sleep than dreaming. Especially in non‐rapid eye movement sleep, conscious experience, sometimes dreamful, sometimes dreamless, also alternates with a loss of consciousness. Yet while dreaming has become established as a topic for interdisciplinary consciousness science and empirically informed philosophy of mind, the same is not true of other kinds of sleep‐related experience, nor is it true of sleep itself. I argue that this is a mistake. Conscious experience in sleep is more diverse than dreaming and we need to explain its different forms as well as the alternation between conscious and unconscious sleep states. We also need to ask how different kinds of sleep‐related experience relate to foundational issues about sleep and wakefulness as well as sleep stages. I survey recent findings and theoretical developments from sleep and dream research to show how the traditional view of sleep and its relation to wakefulness and consciousness is flawed. I then suggest that by refining our frameworks of sleep‐related experiences and sleep staging in tandem, we can work toward a better view. As we are only beginning to understand the diversity of consciousness in sleep, an important aim is programmatic: We need a philosophy of sleep and of consciousness in sleep, not just a philosophy of dreaming, and a future theory of sleep needs to integrate phenomenological considerations with neuroscientific and behavioral evidence. Working toward such a theory will radically transform our understanding of sleep, wakefulness, and our conscious minds.

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“…Observer perspective is a common occurrence in dreams (Rosen & Sutton 2013), but this dream report does not specify what "heard" refers to.…”

Section: Reporting Dreamsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Decreased awareness of and access to the autobiographical self and memories (for a discussion of this see Rosen & Sutton, 2013) may also contribute to the lack of reflection on dream thoughts. Martin and Pacherie (2013) note that unbidden thoughts I argue that although cognitive factors likely play a role in our ability to notice unusual, TI-like experience in sleep, issues associated with reporting dreams are likely to also contribute to the rarity of TI reports.…”

Section: The Cognitive Deficit Explanationmentioning

confidence: 99%

I’m thinking your thoughts while I sleep: Sense of agency and ownership over dream thought.

Rosen¹

2015

Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice

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found that although TI and AH both occur in dreams, TI is very rare. This is an interesting result since TI is common in patients with schizophrenia. I propose two speculative lines of explanation for the rarity of TI in dreams: first, the cognitive differences between the symptoms of schizophrenia and dreams, and second, the problem of dream reporting conditions. Dream reporting conditions are particularly important, as without controls, reports can be vague. Analysis of dream reports reveals that it is often unclear whether 'hearing voices' indicates sound phenomenology or thought phenomenology. I propose that dream reports could be disambiguated given the right experimental conditions and I suggest how this could be achieved in future experimental research.

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Self‐Representation and Perspectives in Dreams

Cited by 31 publications

References 52 publications

What I make up when I wake up: anti-experience views and narrative fabrication of dreams

What I make up when I wake up: anti-experience views and narrative fabrication of dreams

Consciousness in sleep: How findings from sleep and dream research challenge our understanding of sleep, waking, and consciousness

I’m thinking your thoughts while I sleep: Sense of agency and ownership over dream thought.

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