Self-Screening in Targeted Public Transfer Programs

Parsons, Donald O.

doi:10.1086/261781

Cited by 73 publications

(73 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…6 This change resembles the results of Parsons (1991) who shows that the composition of disability benefit applicants depends, among other things, on the stringency of the screening process. However, he considers only two health classes, disabled and able.…”

supporting

confidence: 53%

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Screening Stringency in the Disability Insurance Program

Johansson¹,

Laun²,

Laun³

2014

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy (IFAU) is a research institute under the Swedish Ministry of Employment, situated in Uppsala. IFAU's objective is to promote, support and carry out scientific evaluations. The assignment includes: the effects of labour market and educational policies, studies of the functioning of the labour market and the labour market effects of social insurance policies. IFAU shall also disseminate its results so that they become accessible to different interested parties in Sweden and abroad. Terms of use: Documents inIFAU also provides funding for research projects within its areas of interest. The deadline for applications is October 1 each year. Since the researchers at IFAU are mainly economists, researchers from other disciplines are encouraged to apply for funding.IFAU is run by a Director-General. The institute has a scientific council, consisting of a chairman, the Director-General and five other members. Among other things, the scientific council proposes a decision for the allocation of research grants. A reference group including representatives for employer organizations and trade unions, as well as the ministries and authorities concerned is also connected to the institute. Papers published in the Working Paper Series should, according to the IFAU policy, have been discussed at seminars held at IFAU and at least one other academic forum, and have been read by one external and one internal referee. They need not, however, have undergone the standard scrutiny for publication in a scientific journal. The purpose of the Working Paper Series is to provide a factual basis for public policy and the public policy discussion. AbstractWe propose a strategy for assessing how the inflow to the disability insurance program has been governed over time. We analyze the ex-ante health of individuals entering the program, compared to individuals not entering the program in the same year, by using ex-post mortality. Applying the strategy to Sweden, we find large variation in the relative health of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries over time. Some of the fluctuations correspond well to formal changes to screening stringency. However, we also find large variation in health during periods when no changes to formal eligibility criteria have been pursued.

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supporting

confidence: 53%

“…A potential indicator of screening stringency is the denial rate. Since Parsons (1991), however, it is well known that initial eligibility determination is an important self-screening mechanism. His results suggest that a 10 percent increase in the initial denial rate induced a 4 percent decrease in application rates after 2 years.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Screening Stringency in the Disability Insurance Program

Johansson¹,

Laun²,

Laun³

2014

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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“…Studies of the introduction of disability income for workers whose health prevented them from working has yielded important insights into the way self-reports have responded to changes in economic incentives (Parsons, 1991). There are a large number of other potential quasiexperiments --health interventions, introduction of new or improved services, information campaigns, 20 changes in prices of care or changes in health insurance schemes.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Measurement and Interpretation of Health in Social Surveys

Thomas¹,

Frankenberg²

2000

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“…This paper also contributes to the literature on self-selection and ordeal mechanisms (Nichols, Smolensky and Tideman, 1971;Barzel, 1974;Diamond and Mirrlees, 1978;Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982;Parsons, 1991;Besley and Coate, 1992).…”

mentioning

confidence: 76%

“…In contrast, non-monetary prices may effectively target health products to the poor because selection occurs on willingness to pay in time rather than in money. I develop a model of household demand for a health product at monetary prices and at non-monetary prices based on the classical theory of self-selection into social programs (Nichols, Smolensky and Tideman, 1971;Barzel, 1974;Diamond and Mirrlees, 1978;Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982;Parsons, 1991;Besley and Coate, 1992). The model illustrates three key features of demand.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Nonmonetary Prices Target the Poor?: Evidence from a Field Experiment in India

Hoffmann

2016

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Inter-American Development Bank. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose, as provided below. No derivative work is allowed. Terms of use: Documents inAny dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.Following a peer review process, and with previous written consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a revised version of this work may also be reproduced in any academic journal, including those indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Therefore, the restriction to receive income from such publication shall only extend to the publication's author(s). With regard to such restriction, in case of any inconsistency between the Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license and these statements, the latter shall prevail.Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license.The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent.

show abstract

Self-Screening in Targeted Public Transfer Programs

Cited by 73 publications

References 10 publications

Screening Stringency in the Disability Insurance Program

Screening Stringency in the Disability Insurance Program

The Measurement and Interpretation of Health in Social Surveys

Do Nonmonetary Prices Target the Poor?: Evidence from a Field Experiment in India

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