2021
DOI: 10.1111/fire.12273
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Sell‐side analyst recommendation revisions and hedge fund trading before and after regulation fair disclosure

Abstract: We examine institutional trading in relation to changes in consensus recommendations over time. We find that pre-Reg FD's positive contemporaneous relation between hedge fund trading and change in consensus becomes negative after Reg FD, but the positive relation between nonhedge fund trading and change in consensus continues even after Reg FD. Furthermore, during post-Reg FD, while the performance of hedge funds' trades that contradict with analysts improve, nonhedge funds' trades that agree with analysts sig… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…IBES standardizes these views and converts them into numerical scores where 1 is strong buy, 2 is buy, 3 is neutral, 4 is sell, and 5 is strong sell. We reverse the order of these numerical scores such that higher ratings refer to more favorable recommendations (e.g., strong sell is denoted by 1, and strong buy is denoted by 5) so that a positive number can be assigned for an upgrade.24 This result is consistent withCaglayan et al (2021) who show a negative relation between hedge funds' trades and analysts' recommendation revisions after the implementation of the Regulation Fair Disclosure Act in 2000.25 In this analysis, since we do not have information on the dates of intra-quarter trades of hedge funds and non-hedge funds, we cannot make a definite claim on whether analyst revisions lead to institutional trades, or whether institutional trades and their associated price impacts lead analysts to revise their recommendations. To alleviate this concern, we also compute the previous quarter (q-1) change in consensus values for the 25 bivariate portfolios created based on hedge fund and non-hedge fund demand in quarter q.…”
mentioning
confidence: 57%
“…IBES standardizes these views and converts them into numerical scores where 1 is strong buy, 2 is buy, 3 is neutral, 4 is sell, and 5 is strong sell. We reverse the order of these numerical scores such that higher ratings refer to more favorable recommendations (e.g., strong sell is denoted by 1, and strong buy is denoted by 5) so that a positive number can be assigned for an upgrade.24 This result is consistent withCaglayan et al (2021) who show a negative relation between hedge funds' trades and analysts' recommendation revisions after the implementation of the Regulation Fair Disclosure Act in 2000.25 In this analysis, since we do not have information on the dates of intra-quarter trades of hedge funds and non-hedge funds, we cannot make a definite claim on whether analyst revisions lead to institutional trades, or whether institutional trades and their associated price impacts lead analysts to revise their recommendations. To alleviate this concern, we also compute the previous quarter (q-1) change in consensus values for the 25 bivariate portfolios created based on hedge fund and non-hedge fund demand in quarter q.…”
mentioning
confidence: 57%
“…Sell-side analysts, however, often keep their stock recommendations unchanged for extended periods, making them stale and biased. Hence, our investigation focuses only on analyst revisions, which contain more valuable information and are more trustworthy over time (see Caglayan et al, 2021;Jegadeesh et al, 2004;Jegadeesh & Kim, 2006, 2010Loh & Stulz, 2018;Stickel, 1995;Womack, 1996).…”
Section: Sample Selection and Descriptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, FIs are an effective corporate governance mechanism to monitor the controlling shareholders’ investment decisions (Kim et al., 2016). FIs can urge firms to engage in high‐quality corporate disclosure and increase resources for information production and analysis, thereby decreasing information asymmetry and improving the quality of the information environment (Bae et al., 2006; Caglayan et al., 2021; Tsang et al., 2019). Moreover, with equal access to market‐wide news for all investors, the superior capability of FIs to act faster on common information ensures that they are likely to be efficient processors of common information.…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%