Semantic Externalism, Language Variation, and Sociolinguistic Accommodation

Abstract

Chomsky (1986) has claimed that the prima facie incompatibility between descriptive linguistics and semantic externalism proves that an externalist semantics is impossible. Although it is true that a strong form of externalism does not cohere with descriptive linguistics, sociolinguistic theory can unify the two approaches. The resulting two-level theory reconciles descriptivism, mentalism, and externalism by construing community languages as a function of social identifi cation. This approach allows a fresh look at names and defi nite descriptions while also responding to Chomsky ' s (1993Chomsky ' s ( , 1995 challenge to articulate an externalist theory of meaning that can be used in the scientifi c investigation of language.

Linguistic and Philosophical Considerations on Bayesian Semantics

“…But it would surely be difficult to convince the two parties in the tomato-classification debate that they are not really disagreeing. In other words, in some cases there probably is simply no fact of the matter about whether a disagreement is substantive or verbal in nature: the vague notion of "speaking the same language" can only bear so much theoretical weight (Chomsky 1986;Lassiter 2008). Even if this is wrong, and there is some hidden fact of the matter in this particular case, it is surely not one that we as theorists can reliably intuit.…”

E-Tagging in Context; Information Management across Community Networks

“…An assertion that an individual's language relates to membership in a given community or population may be accurate only to the extent that the community itself is clearly defined. Lassiter (2008) refers to this characterization of language, by analogy with political philosophy, as communitarianism. Other metrics that may be used to define a community, such as co-citation of thematically relevant resources or other bibliometric approaches, are susceptible to similar objections.…”

Metalinguistic proposals

“…If the audience rejects the use that is being "trial-ballooned", the speaker can insist that it was intended as a provocation, or a joke. variation between and within speakers in how they use expressions, and there is no convincing account of how to determine what the "objective facts" about the "legitimate" and "illegitimate" uses of an expression are (Jackman, 2001;Lassiter, 2008). Speakers often have strong beliefs about what the "legitimate" and "illegitimate" uses of expressions are, and can institute lexical norms by criticizing and correcting perceived "misuses" of certain expressions (Niedzielski and Preston, 2000).…”