Senatorial Discourtesy: The Senate's Use of Delay to Shape the Federal Judiciary

The power to nominate and confirm federal judges is shared by Congress and the president, yet few works explicitly address the role that Congress plays in shaping the preselection pool for judicial nominees. In this article, we illuminate this debate by exploring judicial nomination requests from Members of Congress to the Eisenhower and Ford Administrations. In explaining who is nominated, the characteristics of the nominee matter more than the characteristics of the nominator, with the party affiliation of a nominee being the strongest predictive factor. Institutional characteristics are more prevalent at the confirmation stage, where the Senate relied more heavily on its members and the judicial experience of nominees than did presidents in nominating them. Given our results, partisanship appears to have mattered earlier than presumed in judicial nominations, with even ostensibly nonpartisan presidents such as Eisenhower understanding the importance of appointing like-minded individuals to lifetime positions on the bench.

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 56%

Section: Nomination Expectationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Counting Congress In: Patterns of Success in Judicial Nomination Requests by Members of Congress to Presidents Eisenhower and Ford

Rottinghaus

Nicholson

2010

“…Segal (2000), however, contends that descriptive representatives may "feel compelled to perform in the opposite manner to counterbalance internal or external criticism of their job performance" (p. 147). Research focusing on the appointment of federal-court judges may support this view, as Latino judges tend to receive lower American Bar Association ratings (Sen, 2012), experience significant delays in confirmation by the Senate (Bell, 2002;Nixon & Gross, 2001), and work in an environment that is less ethnically diverse. Thus Latino voting behavior may be a product of the social and institutional environment in which they act.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Voting Behavior of Minority Judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Morin

2013

The diversification of the federal courts has led to a number of studies focusing on the voting behavior of African American and, to a lesser extent, Latino judges. Despite expectations that minority judges will vote differently from their White colleagues, extant research demonstrates mixed results. Perhaps one reason for this outcome is that they fail to account for the conditional role that coracial and coethnic claimants might have on behavior. This study examines the voting behavior of minority judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Focusing on employment discrimination claims between 2001 and 2009, this analysis demonstrates that minority judges are not monolithic in their voting behavior. While African American judges are more likely to vote in favor of Black claimants, Latino judges are less likely to vote in favor of the claimant more generally. In all, the findings have important implications for substantive policy outcomes.

“…Notes 1. Of course, groups also engage in proactive behavior by attempting to influence who the judges are (and not just the behavior of judges already on the bench) (Bell, 2002a(Bell, , 2002bScherer, 2005).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Amici Curiae in the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Martinek

2006

Students of law and courts know a great deal about amici curiae vis-à-vis the U.S. Supreme Court. Conversely, scholars know little to nothing about amici curiae in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. This article begins to address this deficiency in our state of knowledge by examining the incidence of amici at the courts of appeals level. Drawing in part on the existing literature regarding amici in the Supreme Court, I develop a model of amicus curiae participation in the courts of appeals that arises directly from a consideration of the goals of potential amicus curiae filers. To wit, amici are interested in obtaining favorable rulings in the courts, and, hence, there will be more participation by amici in a case the more desirable that case is as a policy vehicle. An analysis relying on the data available in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database supports this argument.