2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2020.02.002
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Separation between second price auctions with personalized reserves and the revenue optimal auction

Abstract: What fraction of the single item n buyers setting's expected optimal revenue (MyeRev) can the second price auction with reserves achieve? In the special case where the buyers' valuation distributions are all drawn i.i.d. and the distributions satisfy the regularity condition, the second price auction with an anonymous reserve (ASP) is the optimal auction itself. As the setting gets more complex, there are established upper bounds on the fraction of MyeRev that ASP can achieve. On the contrary, no such upper bo… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1

Citation Types

0
1
0

Year Published

2021
2021
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
2
2

Relationship

0
4

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 4 publications
(1 citation statement)
references
References 13 publications
0
1
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Beyond the Anonymous Reserve mechanism, other simple auctions with the more powerful personalized reserves are also extensively studied [7,28,35].…”
Section: Further Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Beyond the Anonymous Reserve mechanism, other simple auctions with the more powerful personalized reserves are also extensively studied [7,28,35].…”
Section: Further Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%