Separation of powers and the erosion of the ‘right to property’ in India

Abstract

There has been a substantial erosion of the ‘right to property’ with respect to state takings in India, reflected in a progression of amendments to the Indian Constitution. Among other things, these amendments signify a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. To study the implications of this on governance in relation to state takings, this paper juxtaposes a narration of events that describe the progressive erosion of the ‘right to property’ against a heuristic analytical structure that seeks to capture the costs of violating the doctrine of separation of powers. This analysis is then utilized to point to the social costs that characterize the state acquisitions (takings) regime in India. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006Indian constitution, Property rights, Separation of powers, Eminent domain, Social costs, H11, K11, GD72D73,

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