Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why

Tilford, Earl H.

doi:10.21236/ada421969

Cited by 16 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…The first time that guided munitions precipitated a change in U.S. air-to-ground operation strategy, was during the Vietnam War. During Operation Linebacker, laser guided Paveway bombs began to changed the way precision guided munitions were deployed 39,40 . In order to target these devices, an airman targeted a laser designator to identify the target.…”

Section: Increasing Accuracy Through Better Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Advances in Inertial Guidance Technology for Aerospace Systems

Braun

Putnam

Steinfeldt

et al. 2013

AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) Conference

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Section: Increasing Accuracy Through Better Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Advances in Inertial Guidance Technology for Aerospace Systems

Braun

Putnam

Steinfeldt

et al. 2013

AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) Conference

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“…121 Kissinger noted that "there was no intractable, substantive issue separating the two sides, but rather an apparent North Vietnamese determination not to allow the agreement to be completed." 122 Whether North Vietnam figured that Congress would end funding for U.S. operations or that it could exacerbate tensions between Washington and Saigon, they thought, at the very least, time would allow the insurgency to extract better terms. Regarding Congress, Hanoi was correct.…”

Section: Historymentioning

confidence: 99%

Increasing Airpower's Effectiveness: Applying the U.S. Army's Operational Design Methodology to Airpower in Warfare

Serfass¹

2010

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“…SAMs had to be fired from them first because Soviet technicians were involved in setting up these sites and President Johnson wanted to avoid at all costs any casualties among Soviet personnel in theatre. A three year coercive campaign failed to stop the North Vietnamese support to and control of the insurgency in the South, and it cost the Americans over 800 aircrew and 990 aircraft (40) .…”

Section: Intelligence and Targetingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Air power and the future battlespace

Goulter

2009

Aeronaut. j.

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since the end of the Second World War, and that these commitments will consume a major proportion of defence resources (1) . Indeed, it is a stated air force planning assumption that it will continue to support land operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, in essence, for as long as it takes (2) . However, it is also the paper's contention that we should not focus on counter-insurgency operations to the exclusion of other possible commitments. This paper is intended, in part, to be a corrective to the dangerous line of argumentation appearing after 9/11 which advocated our completely reconfiguring our armed services to meet the terrorist threat. The danger posed by rogue states has not evaporated, and there is still a requirement for strategic effect operations, or at the very least deterrence, against nations which pose a threat to our national security. The paper also aims to redress the balance after a decade of viewing air power very largely as a supporting component in the joint environment. The paper also seeks to challenge the accepted wisdom that joint means land supported by maritime and air. The nature of a conflict or whatever the scenario determines which Service environment is dominant, and this can change over time. In short, we must be able to operate effectively across the full military spectrum, from peace support operations (PSO), through to counter-insurgency (COIN), to 'high end' war-fighting.Given Britain's financial constraints, we cannot afford to recapitalise the RAF in the foreseeable future, and so we must think harder about how we utilise what assets we have. This does not mean purely thinking about which platforms can perform what variety of roles, but it entails a fundamental step change in air power conceptualisation in

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Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why

Cited by 16 publications

References 1 publication

Advances in Inertial Guidance Technology for Aerospace Systems

Advances in Inertial Guidance Technology for Aerospace Systems

Increasing Airpower's Effectiveness: Applying the U.S. Army's Operational Design Methodology to Airpower in Warfare

Air power and the future battlespace

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