Severe Poverty as a Systemic Human Rights Violation

Ashford, Elizabeth

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678426.003.0007

Cited by 36 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…In sum, I have discussed three issues so far: (1) the different kinds of actions that are required in the fight against structural injustice, focusing mainly on the problem of global poverty, (2) what it means for large, unorganised groups of people to have the ability to perform a distributive collective action, and, in particular, (3) what group members need to know in order to be able to act. The upshot was that in order for such unstructured groups to have the required collective ability, there needs to be at least one collective pattern of action, which, if realized, will fix the problem in question, and this pattern is salient (or obvious) to group members.…”

Section: Large-scale Distributive Actionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural Injustice and Massively Shared Obligations

Schwenkenbecher¹

2020

J Applied Philosophy

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It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for 'ordinary citizens' to have collective obligations vis-a-vis large-scale injustice? In this article, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large, dispersed, and unorganised groups of people are often in a position to perform distributive collective actions. As such, ordinary citizens can have massively shared obligations to address structural injustice through distributive action, but, ultimately, such obligations are 'collective' only in a fairly weak sense.

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Section: Large-scale Distributive Actionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural Injustice and Massively Shared Obligations

Schwenkenbecher¹

2020

J Applied Philosophy

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“… The Natural View is not the only possible view of the relationship between backward‐ and forward‐looking responsibility. For an alternative, which has seemed attractive to some (see Young ; ; Ashford , 144ff). So even if the 'Natural View' is false, it would not follow that the “we” who Pogge takes to be violating a negative duty are off the hook where forward‐looking responsibility is concerned.…”

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confidence: 99%

“… Ashford (); Meckled‐Garcia (). For an earlier discussion of a position rather like N1cc see also Ashford ().…”

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confidence: 99%

“… Ashford () suggests that Meckled‐Garcia may go wrong in assuming that rights violations must involve discrete actions by individual agents. On my understanding of Meckled‐Garcia's view this seems inessential: there's no reason why we need to be able to tell which acts of a particular agent are the ones which unreasonably impose harm or risk: all we need to know is that there are some such acts.…”

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confidence: 99%

“… This strategy is suggested in Ashford (, 140–41), although it is not clear whether she would subscribe to the particular conception of reasonableness that I have suggested as an alternative to Meckled‐Garcia's.…”

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confidence: 99%

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