2011
DOI: 10.1007/s10982-011-9118-x
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Sex-Selective Abortion: A Matter of Choice

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Cited by 7 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…As it always happens, even when there is widespread rejection of a given practice, there is always someone who favors it. For instance, Williams [37] has argued that, those who favor a eugenic stand (selective abortion of disabled fetuses to ameliorate the perceived average genetic quality of our offspring), cannot consistently accept the prohibition of sex-selective abortion, since a woman's right to choose pregnancy termination should not be limited. From a feminist theoretical perspective, it would of course be paradoxical to allow women to terminate pregnancy to prevent the birth of a female neonate, but if one takes the point of view that women have a right to abortion whatever the motivation, Williams would be right.…”
Section: The Ethics Of Sex-selective Infanticides; a Pragmatic Counter-argumentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As it always happens, even when there is widespread rejection of a given practice, there is always someone who favors it. For instance, Williams [37] has argued that, those who favor a eugenic stand (selective abortion of disabled fetuses to ameliorate the perceived average genetic quality of our offspring), cannot consistently accept the prohibition of sex-selective abortion, since a woman's right to choose pregnancy termination should not be limited. From a feminist theoretical perspective, it would of course be paradoxical to allow women to terminate pregnancy to prevent the birth of a female neonate, but if one takes the point of view that women have a right to abortion whatever the motivation, Williams would be right.…”
Section: The Ethics Of Sex-selective Infanticides; a Pragmatic Counter-argumentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is that, because these arguments address issues that are orthogonal to the moral problem of abortion (as traditionally understood), they will predictably do little, if anything, to establish conclusions about the way abortion law should be framed that allay the central concerns of citizens who hold either moderate or more conservative views. They are not, in other words, likely to be effective or valuable proxies in public reason for those citizens' inadmissible views about prenatal moral 18 For an argument, however, to the effect that those of us who are committed to a woman's right to selectively abort for fetal disability ought also to affirm a right to sex-selective abortion, see Williams (2012). status.…”
Section: Third Parties and Abortionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, my ultimate point is not that termination for sex is morally analogous to termination for disability. Others have made this argument already, notably both with the aim of showing that sex termination is therefore morally permissible (Williams ), or alternatively, that termination because of disability is not (Wong ). The problem with an approach that analogizes disability and sex is that it presupposes—at least for the sake of argument—that these are effectively two different and separate characteristics.…”
Section: Selective Termination: Disability And/or Sexmentioning
confidence: 99%