Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda

Dallaire, Roméo; Beardsley, Brent

doi:10.2307/40203936

Cited by 97 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…He declared that the Security Council needed to examine the “availability of resources,” and that the mandate needed to focus on “staying within the limits of available resources” (United Nations 1994 c , 1994 d ). Many scholars have correctly emphasized Clinton's concern for reduced funding for foreign operations and UN peacekeeping at this time (Barnett 2002; Burkhalter 1994; Callahan 1997; Cohen 2007; Dallaire 2003; Des Forges 1999; Des Forges 2003; Destexhe 1995; Eriksson 1996; Klinghoffer 1998; Lewis 1994 b ; Lord 2006; Maney 2016; Power 2002; Prunier 1996; Riley 2016; Semujanga 2003; Soderberg 2007).…”

Section: Knowledge and Capabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is more reasonable to believe that the U.S. Government did not conduct jamming operations because it was too expensive. Every hour of radio jamming would have cost $8,500, with the total operation amounting to $4 million (Adelman and Sunrke 1999; Cohen 2007; Dallaire 2003). Monique Mujawamariya challenged the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, “How much are you willing to pay to save…500 lives in Kigali?” (Subcommittee 1994 b ).…”

Section: Knowledge and Capabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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President Clinton's Nonintervention in the Rwanda Genocide

Szandzik

2022

World Affairs

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This research analyzes Clinton's decision to not intervene in the Rwandan genocide. The methodology used is a historical analysis and interpretation of primary and secondary source material. Clinton admitted that not intervening in the Rwandan genocide was one of the greatest regrets of his presidency. There was not a substantial amount of domestic support for an intervention into Rwanda and Clinton did not attempt to use his influence to change that disposition. Clinton did not attempt to change domestic sentiments due to his priorities of reduced funding for foreign operations and the avoidance of ‘mission creep.’ The most common fault in the current historiography is the claim that Clinton did not intervene in Rwanda because of the failed mission that had recently occurred in Somalia, which does not align with the available evidence. Upon leaving office, he accepted ownership of his poor decisions and expressed sincere regret.

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Section: Knowledge and Capabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Knowledge and Capabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

President Clinton's Nonintervention in the Rwanda Genocide

Szandzik

2022

World Affairs

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“…As such, in cases where policymakers mention a genocide in Security Council speeches, the authorization of force in Security Council resolutions should become more likely. On the contrary, of course, stands the abysmal track-record of cases where genocide was committed, but international actors failed to prevent it 42 -suggesting that genocide might entrap or hollow.…”

Section: Searching For (Normative) Imperatives To Actmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Acting under Chapter 7’: rhetorical entrapment, rhetorical hollowing, and the authorization of force in the UN Security Council, 1995–2017

Scherzinger

2022

International Relations

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After more than 25 years of scholarship, the deliberative turn in international relations (IR) theory is ready to be revisited with a fresh perspective. Using new methods from automated text analyses, this explorative article investigates how rhetoric may bind action. It does so by building upon Schimmelfennig’s original account of rhetorical entrapment. To begin, I theorize the opposite of entrapment, which I call rhetorical hollowing. Rhetorical hollowing describes a situation in which actors use normative rhetoric, but instead of advancing their interests, such rhetoric fails to increase their chances of obtaining the desired outcome because the normative force of their rhetoric has eroded over time. To provide plausibility to both entrapment and hollowing, I present two mechanisms by which language is connected with action in the United Nations Security Council. Finally, I run a series of time-series-cross-section models on selected dictionary terms conducive to entrapment or hollowing on all speeches and an original Security Council resolution corpus from 1995 to 2017. The research shows that while mentioning ‘human rights’ is consistently associated with increased odds of authorization of force; the word ‘terrorism’ is associated with a decrease of odds for intervention. This finding suggests that some terms may not only entrap or hollow but also normatively backfire.

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“…This mix of active and passive moral exclusion is what made the widespread butchery of the Rwandan genocide possible. International Red Cross President Cornelio Sommaruga described the attitude of the outside world as desertion (Prunier, 1995; see also Dallaire, 2003). The refusal of the community of nations both to name what was occurring genocide and to send troops or equipment emboldened those promoting and engaging in genocide to act with impunity.…”

Section: Hate Conflict and Moral Exclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hate, Conflict, and Moral Exclusion.

Opotow¹

2005

The Psychology of Hate.

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1992) described hate as occurring on a spectrum that includes mild, intermediate, and severe forms.These multiple dimensions of hate are only one reason for its complex' ity. As Yanay (2002) observed: the entry of hatred into our daily speech does not help clarify the ways in which hatred works. The wide range of meanings and definitions, and the various contexts in which the concept of hatred is invoked only contribute to its opaqueness, (p. 53) Perhaps because of hate's complexity, opacity, and range of manifestations and the diverse dimensions that define it, psychological research has tended to narrow its focus on particular kinds of hate. Psychology has, for example, scholarship on the expression of hate in hate crimes (cf. Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002;Cogan & Marcus-Newhall, 2002; Herek & Berrill, 1992); on its psychoanalytic sources and implications for treatment (Akhtar, Kramer, & Parens, 1995); hate among particular categories of people, such as children (Varma, 1993); and hate at a particular level of analysis, such as interpersonal hate (Goldberg, 1993) and mass hate (Kressel, 1996). As a result, the field of psychology rarely considers hate as a construct with breadth and depth and, as Sternberg (chap. 2, this volume) observes, it has generated few theories of hate. In support of his observation, psychological and social science dictionaries and encyclopedias rarely have entries for hate and jump from "handedness" or "hallucination" to "Hawthorne Effect," "health psychology," or "Fritz Heider" (but see Schoenewolf, 1994). Thus, the psychological study of hate has a curious centrifugality that deals with particular manifestations of hate, but offers few cross-contextual analyses that examine the core meaning of hate across contexts.Agreeing with Kernberg's (1992) contention that mild, intermediate, and severe hate are different aspects of a unified construct, this chapter explores hate as a coherent construct that includes milder and more severe manifestations. Because I am particularly concerned with the potential of hate to foster extreme violence, I see hate as more than the emotions and cognitions that ordinarily describe it. 1 suspect that when hate becomes destructive, morals are likely to act as an accelerant, particularly moral justifications for harm doing, or moral exclusion (cf. Opotow, 1990). The first section of this chapter defines hate, moral exclusion, and their interaction. The second section uses data from interviews with middle school students and published accounts of hate radio in Rwanda to describe hate in mild and severe contexts. The third section considers the psychology of resisting hate. It does so by considering two exemplars, a middle school student and a Rwandan man, who both resisted hate when it was supported by the social context. The final section reflects on the implications of these data for the psychology of hate. 122 SUSAN OPOTOWCopyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution. HATEWebster's Dictionary (Gove, 1981) defines hate...

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Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda

Cited by 97 publications

References 3 publications

President Clinton's Nonintervention in the Rwanda Genocide

President Clinton's Nonintervention in the Rwanda Genocide

‘Acting under Chapter 7’: rhetorical entrapment, rhetorical hollowing, and the authorization of force in the UN Security Council, 1995–2017

Hate, Conflict, and Moral Exclusion.

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