Proceedings of the 20th ACM SIGPLAN/SIGBED International Conference on Languages, Compilers, and Tools for Embedded Systems 2019
DOI: 10.1145/3316482.3326356
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SHAKTI-MS: a RISC-V processor for memory safety in C

Abstract: In this era of IoT devices, security is very often traded off for smaller device footprint and low power consumption. Considering the exponentially growing security threats of IoT and cyber-physical systems, it is important that these devices have built-in features that enhance security. In this paper, we present Shakti-MS, a lightweight RISC-V processor with built-in support for both temporal and spatial memory protection. At run time, Shakti-MS can detect and stymie memory misuse in C and C++ programs, with … Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(9 citation statements)
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References 31 publications
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“…Menon et al [51] developed a RISC-V 64 bit processor Shakti-T, which supports a customized ISA extension containing 8 new instructions for temporal and spatial memory attack protection. Das et al [62] developed another RISC-V processor Shakti-MS. They proposed two new instructions and simply modified the compiler, which can automatically insert these new instructions to realize memory protection during hardware operation.…”
Section: H Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Menon et al [51] developed a RISC-V 64 bit processor Shakti-T, which supports a customized ISA extension containing 8 new instructions for temporal and spatial memory attack protection. Das et al [62] developed another RISC-V processor Shakti-MS. They proposed two new instructions and simply modified the compiler, which can automatically insert these new instructions to realize memory protection during hardware operation.…”
Section: H Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As shown in Table 1, some approaches mixed the way to compensate for limitations. For example, ALEXIA and Shakti-MS mixed the per-object and per-pointer methods for the bounds check of the sub-object [8,16]. Further details are provided in later sections.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hardware-based checking. Many solutions utilize dedicated hardware support to perform memory checks [32], [33], [35], [79], [122], [125]. Watchdog [35] follows the behavior similar to CETS.…”
Section: Pointer Dereferences Checkingmentioning
confidence: 99%