Shaming and democracy: Explaining inter-state shaming in international organizations

Abstract

Why do some states name and shame norm-violating states while other states abstain? Inter-state naming and shaming is typically viewed as a political tool to punish adversaries and reward allies. In this study, I propose a regime-type explanation for inter-state shaming in international politics. I pose two interrelated questions. First, are democracies more prone to condemn norm violations than non-democratic countries? Second, are democracies likely to shame each other in cases of norm violations? In search of answers to these questions, I use a unique dataset on inter-state shaming the International Labour Organization (ILO) for the period 1991–2011. In line with my main argument, the results suggest that democracies are more likely than non-democracies to engage in the shaming of norm violators, while providing no evidence for special relations between democracies. In addition, this study unpacks other factors influencing the inter-state shaming. The findings have implications for how we understand state interactions in international politics.

Where Help Is Needed Most? Explaining Reporting Strategies of the International Trade Union Confederation

“…The ILO puts the interests of member organizations first, while the ITUC represents narrow interests of its members. While the ILO is unique for its tripartite structure and is perceived as more consensus-oriented with regard to decision-making related to the adoption of conventions and recommendations, the ILO's public identification and scrutiny of norm-violating states is confrontational and contested (Koliev, 2019;Koliev and Lebovic, 2018;Weisband, 2000). In this respect, which is of analytical interest to this study, the ILO resembles other IOs, such as the UN's Human Rights Council (Lebovic and Voeten, 2006).…”

“…In this context, it is important to note that this relationship is not exclusive to the ITUC as an INGO, and neither is it a necessary condition for bandwagoning. Whereas the decision-making in the ILO is consensus-based when it comes to adopting conventions and other instruments, the public identification of violators by the ILO is confrontational and contested (Koliev, 2019;Koliev and Lebovic, 2018). Although caution always should be raised when generalizing, the theoretical reasoning of this study should be applicable to other INGOs with similar organizational characteristics that work within the human rights area.…”

“…But how do INGOs decide which states to single out for "naming and shaming"? 2 While we have considerable knowledge of how and when governments within international organizations (IOs) target violators (Koliev, 2019;Terman and Voeten, 2018), we know little about what factors influence INGOs' decisions to target states for naming and shaming in IOs.…”

Compliance without coercion: Effects of reporting on international labor rights

“…Labor rights, as enshrined in ILO conventions, are a distinct subset of human rights. Compared to civil and political rights, including personal integrity rights, labor rights are relatively more contested, normatively and politically (Mantouvalou, 2012; Koliev, 2019). While the ratification rates for ILO conventions are high, and governments and social partners express rhetorical support for these conventions, the political dynamics around labor rights are particular (Mosley & Uno, 2007; Peksen & Blanton, 2017).…”

“…The discussions and conclusions are summarized in the annual report of the CAS. Given the discomfort of this procedure to non-compliant states, the shaming practices of the CAS have been a controversial issue for a long time (Koliev, 2019). Shaming of states by the CAS is much less common than countries being listed as non-compliant in CEACR reports.…”