Shaping Intra-Party Democracy: On the Legal Regulation of Internal Party Organizations

Biezen, Ingrid van; Piccio, Daniela R.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661879.003.0003

Cited by 61 publications

(34 citation statements)

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“…However, some variation exists in the capacity and opportunity of parties to sponsor their candidates, resulting from recent democratisation initiatives in the form of country‐level legislation and internal party rules (Van Biezen ; Scarrow : 159–160). Some European parties have adopted internal regulations and formal country‐level legislation that tighten external control and expenditure limits on party financing of MP and candidate activities and, thus, lower the capacity of the party to impose discipline on individual candidates through financial rewards (Van Biezen ; Scarrow ; Van Biezen & Piccio ). Such efforts are intended, at least in part, to strengthen transparency and alleviate the public perceptions of parties as professional organisations motivated by power and money and, in turn, increase trust, engagement and membership among citizens (Rashkova & Van Biezen : 890; Scarrow ).…”

Section: Party Constraints On Personalisation In Election Campaignsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Campaigning on behalf of the party? Party constraints on candidate campaign personalisation

Bøggild

Pedersen

2017

European J Political Res

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This article analyses what makes political candidates run a party‐focused or personalised election campaign. Prior work shows that candidates face incentives from voters and the media to personalise their campaign rhetoric and promises at the expense of party policy. This has raised concerns about the capacity of parties to govern effectively and voters’ ability to hold individual politicians accountable. This article builds on the literature on party organisation and considers the possible constraints candidates face from their party in personalising their election campaigns. Specifically, it is argued that party control over the candidate nomination process and campaign financing constrains most political candidates in following electoral incentives for campaign personalisation. Using candidate survey data from the 2009 EP election campaign in 27 countries, the article shows how candidates from parties in which party officials exerted greater control over the nomination process and campaign finances were less likely to engage in personalised campaigning at the expense of the party programme. The findings imply that most parties, as central gatekeepers and resource suppliers, hold important control mechanisms for countering the electoral pressure for personalisation and advance our understanding of the incentives and constraints candidates face when communicating with voters. The article discusses how recent democratic reforms, paradoxically, might induce candidate personalisation with potential negative democratic consequences.

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Section: Party Constraints On Personalisation In Election Campaignsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Campaigning on behalf of the party? Party constraints on candidate campaign personalisation

Bøggild

Pedersen

2017

European J Political Res

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“…More broadly speaking our findings further highlight the importance of political dynamics in the working of party conflict regulation and stress that the politicization of party tribunals should not be underestimated, even when party procedures replicate rule of law standards as they have to under German party law. To put our findings on a more general footing, future research could apply our theoretical argument more broadly and test it in legal settings that also legally require internal party tribunals, for example Czech Republic, Romania and Portugal (Biezen and Piccio 2013), as well as parties that have introduced independent tribunals voluntary such as the Liberal Democrats or Greens in the UK (Bolleyer et al 2018). More specifically, future research should also focus on how to improve the neutrality requirement within parties or more clearly set out the limits of such an approach.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Judicial decision-making within political parties: A political approach

2019

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How do German intra-party tribunals manage internal conflicts? More specifically, why do they accept some cases for trial but reject others? Required by law to strictly adhere to implement rule of law standards, German intra-party tribunals are designed to insulate conflict regulation from politics. Meanwhile, research on judicial politics highlights the role of political and strategic considerations in accepting cases for trial. Building on the latter, we develop a theory that emphasizes tribunals’ political concerns such as winning elections. We test our hypotheses with a mixed-effects logit model on a novel data set covering 1088 tribunal decisions in six German parties from 1967 until 2015. Our findings indicate that political factors exert a strong effect on tribunal case acceptance. Tribunals are more likely to accept cases when suffering electoral loss and after losing government office. Moreover, tribunals dismiss cases more easily when their parties display relatively high levels of policy agreement.

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“…In the literature on political parties, the development towards 'semi-public agencies' is often described as a general trend. Recent empirical studies of party laws, however, show that the extent and character of such regulations varies considerably between countries (van Biezen & Borz, 2012;van Biezen & Piccio, 2013). The established democracies, such as the Nordic countries, have more limited regulations of political parties, instead focusing on their electoral functions.…”

Section: State Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Civil society institutions or semi-public agencies? State regulation of parties and voluntary organizations in Norway

Saglie

Sivesind

2018

Journal of Civil Society

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The relationship between the Norwegian State on the one hand, and political parties and voluntary organizations on the other, has traditionally been based on mutual trust. To assess the claim that civil society institutions are developing towards 'semi-public agencies', we review state regulation of Norwegian voluntary organizations and political parties. The State does demand more accountability and transparency in return for public funding, but many aspects are also regulated scarcely or not at all. This indicates that substantial mutual trust remains. This relationship might be characterized as a partnership based on interdependence, rather than colonization.

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Shaping Intra-Party Democracy: On the Legal Regulation of Internal Party Organizations

Cited by 61 publications

References 0 publications

Campaigning on behalf of the party? Party constraints on candidate campaign personalisation

Campaigning on behalf of the party? Party constraints on candidate campaign personalisation

Judicial decision-making within political parties: A political approach

Civil society institutions or semi-public agencies? State regulation of parties and voluntary organizations in Norway

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