Share and share alike? Gender-pairing, personality, and cognitive ability as determinants of giving

Ben‐Ner, Avner; Kong, Fanmin; Putterman, Louis

doi:10.1016/s0167-4870(03)00065-5

Cited by 238 publications

(159 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…By contrast, Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, and Walkowitz (2011) found that low neuroticism and high Openness to Experience predicted more cooperative transfers. Using the dictator game paradigm, Ben-Ner, Kong, and Putterman (2004) reported significant associations between agreeableness and (low) extraversion and the sum offered by the dictator. Finally, Kurzban and Houser (2001) reported non-significant associations between Big Five personality traits and social preferences.…”

Section: Individual Differences In Social Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Personality accounts for stable preferences and expectations across a range of simple games

Brocklebank

Lewis

Bates

2011

Personality and Individual Differences

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Personality accounts for stable preferences and expectations across a range of simple gamesCitation for published version: Brocklebank, S, Lewis, GJ & Bates, TC 2011, 'Personality accounts for stable preferences and expectations across a range of simple games' Personality and Individual Differences, vol. 51, no. 8, Publisher Rights Statement: NOTICE: this is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in Personality and Individual Differences Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Personality and Individual Differences, 51(8), 881-886, doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2011.07.007 General rightsCopyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policyThe University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.Download date: 01. Apr. 2019 NOTICE: this is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in Personality and Individual Differences Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Personality and Individual Differences, 51(8), 881-886, doi: 10.1016Differences, 51(8), 881-886, doi: 10. /j.paid.2011 Abstract Behaviour on even simple experimental games shows considerable individual differences, but previous attempts to link these preferences to stable personality traits have had mixed results. Here we address three limitations of earlier studies, namely: 1) uncertainties concerning the reliability of preferences; 2) use of personality instruments with limited cross-study comparability; and 3) confounds where more than one psychological motive can lead to a particular choice. Sixty-seven participants completed 12 distinct real-money games twice over a two-week interval along with 6 measures concerning their expectations about other players' choices. Personality was measured using the full NEO-PI-R. Choices were highly stable across time (r = .84).Moreover, choices on the 12 games and 6 expectations reflected a single underlying dimension of "prosocial orientation", measuring concern for the payoffs received by other player...

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Section: Individual Differences In Social Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Personality accounts for stable preferences and expectations across a range of simple games

Brocklebank

Lewis

Bates

2011

Personality and Individual Differences

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“…The second treatment condition directly tests this proposition, by exogenously making the decision situation cognitively more 1 For a deviating result for female participants see Ben-Ner et al (2004) demanding through reducing the time available for deliberation. Thereby I look into the question, whether cognitive abilities correlate with social preferences independently from the decision environment or whether an increase in cognitive complexity has a moderating effect.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smart or Selfish - When Smart Guys Finish Nice

Lohse

2014

SSRN Journal

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In three different variants of an one-shot public good game I analyze the relationship between cooperation and cognitive abilities, assessed through the cognitive reflection test (CRT). In a between-subjects design, the baseline case is contrasted with two treatment conditions that allow to control for two potentially moderating factors: By employing a test for the presence of confusion, the first condition scrutinizes whether higher cognitive abilities are correlated with cooperation proper or simply grant a better understanding of the incentive structure. The second condition explores the proposition that the link between cognitive abilities and cooperation could depend on the complexity of the decision situation. To exogenously create a cognitively more demanding choice setting, subjects had to decide under time pressure. I find a strong and positive relationship between CRT-scores and cooperation, that is not driven by confusion. Time pressure has a strongly moderating effect on this relationship.

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“…It should be noted that there is also evidence linking higher cognitive skills to less pro-social behavior. For example, Ben-Ner et al (2004) find a negative relationship between their measure of cognitive skills and dictator game giving (but only for women). Brandstätter and Güth (2002), however, find no effect of cognitive skills on behavior in dictator and ultimatum games.…”

Section: Individual Determinants Of Bidding Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

An Externality-Robust Auction: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Bartling

Netzer

2014

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA in terms of efficiency and revenue but, in contrast to the SPA, is externality-robust. The externality-robust auction (ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful bidding is encouraged by bonus payments. We test the robustness property experimentally by comparing SPA and ERA. We replicate the earlier finding of significant average overbidding in the SPA, but we find that bidders bid on average their value in the ERA. We conduct additional treatments where bidders play against the computer and we use controls for cognitive skills and joy of winning to further pin down the reasons behind the subjects' bidding behavior. Terms of use: Documents inKeywords: second-price auction, spitefulness, mechanism design, experimental auctions JEL Classification: C91, D03, D44, D82 * Email: bjoern.bartling@econ.uzh.ch and nick.netzer@econ.uzh.ch. We are very grateful to Felix Bierbrauer for ongoing discussions about the project. We also acknowledge very helpful comments

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Share and share alike? Gender-pairing, personality, and cognitive ability as determinants of giving

Cited by 238 publications

References 17 publications

Personality accounts for stable preferences and expectations across a range of simple games

Personality accounts for stable preferences and expectations across a range of simple games

Smart or Selfish - When Smart Guys Finish Nice

An Externality-Robust Auction: Theory and Experimental Evidence

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