Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations

Alonso, Facundo M.

doi:10.1086/599984

Cited by 79 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Each of relying on p and 23 For the purposes of our discussion, I assume that a relevant settle condition on intentions that we act must be (cognitively) responsive to conditions (a)-(c) above. 24 In what follows I build partly on ideas discussed in previous work (Alonso 2009). 25 Certainly, if Maria and I each eventually form the intention that we dance, partly in reliance on conditions (a)-(c) to hold, and if those conditions do hold, then both our intentions that we dance will have settled the issue of our dancing the tango in fact-that is, they will have led us to dance the tango together in an appropriate way.…”

Section: Reliance and Beliefmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Intending, Settling, and Relying

Alonso¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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Philosophers of action of different persuasions have suggested that there is a tight connection between the phenomenon of intending and the phenomena of "being settled on" and of "settling" a course of action. My intention to attend a conference this weekend settles in my mind the issue of what to do then. It also settles that issue in fact, since it leads me to attend the conference this weekend. Many have suggested, in addition, that the cited connection supports an important constraint on intention. The constraint, to put it simply, is that one may only intend what one takes one's so intending as settling. Thus, one cannot intend to win the lottery if one does not take one's so intending as settling the issue of one's winning it, as being efficacious in causing that result. This condition has traditionally been understood as a doxastic constraint on intention: what one takes one's intention as settling is what one believes one's so intending as settling.In this paper I propose an alternative conception of such a constraint. I suggest that we conceive of it in terms of the attitude of reliance, rather than of belief. My aim in the paper is three-fold: to clarify the connection between intending to act and the phenomena of being settled on and of settling a course of action; to provide support for the reliance conception of the cited constraint; and to show that this conception drives a wedge in the familiar dispute, between doxastic and conative accounts of intention, as to whether intending to act necessarily involves the belief that one will so act.

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Section: Reliance and Beliefmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…And I have myself pursued a similar strategy in developing an alternative view of the nature of shared intention (Alonso 2009(Alonso , 2016b. I also think that the general structure of Bratman's response to Velleman's incoherence challenge is along the right lines.…”

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confidence: 99%

Intending, Settling, and Relying

Alonso¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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“…In this paper Bratman refers to a collaborative activity as a shared cooperative activity (SCA) and identifies three critical features of collaborative activity (or an SCA): commitment to the joint activity (CJA), mutual responsiveness (MR), and commitment to mutual support (CMS). Bratman's theory and his later related work (Bratman, 1993(Bratman, , 1997(Bratman, , 1999) have influenced research in a variety of fields including psychology (Alonso, 2009;Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011), sociology (Pellizzoni, 2001;Tomasello, 2006), computer science (Jennings, 1996;Panzarasa, Jennings, & Norman, 2002), and computational linguistics (Lochbaum, 1998).…”

Section: Human-computer Collaborationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Conceptual Model for User-System Collaboration: Enhancing Usability of Complex Information Systems

Xu¹,

Topi²

2017

CAIS

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Abstract:A variety of organizations around the world use complex information systems (e.g., enterprise resource planning and supply chain management systems). However, poor usability caused by system complexity continues to frustrate users and damage the reputation of these systems. In this study, we address usability issues with complex information systems from the human-computer collaboration perspective by modeling user-system interaction as a joint activity between the system and its users. We propose a conceptual model for user-system collaboration, elaborate on the components in the model and the relationships between the components, derive the required capabilities for collaborative information systems, and establish conceptual relationships between system collaborative behaviors and usability. We use empirical evidence gathered from a qualitative field study on ERP systems to illustrate the model and the possible impact of system collaborativeness (i.e., the presence or absence of collaborative capabilities) on usability. We do so to provide a strong conceptual foundation for modeling user-system collaboration and to encourage designers to employ the collaboration metaphor during system design and, thus, help them develop future complex information systems with better usability.

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“…Philosophers have studied in detail the roles of intentions in coordinated and shared agency (Bratman 1999;Searle 1995;Tuomela 1995;Alonso 2008), but the philosophical work on how intentions transform decision problems have so far overlooked the multi-agent case. The situation is similar in AI and in BDI models: much attention has been paid to rational interaction, but the models of intention-based transformation of decision problems remain individualistic (see the references above).…”

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confidence: 99%

Intentions and interactive transformations of decision problems

Roy

2009

Synthese

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In this paper I study two ways of transforming decision problems on the basis of previously adopted intentions, ruling out incompatible options and imposing a standard of relevance, with a particular focus on situations of strategic interaction. I show that in such situations problems arise which do not appear in the single-agent case, namely that transformation of decision problems can leave the agents with no option compatible with what they intend. I characterize conditions on the agents' intentions which avoid such problematic scenarios, in a way that requires each agent to take account of the intentions of others.

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Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations

Cited by 79 publications

References 9 publications

Intending, Settling, and Relying

Intending, Settling, and Relying

A Conceptual Model for User-System Collaboration: Enhancing Usability of Complex Information Systems

Intentions and interactive transformations of decision problems

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