Sharing and Shaping: A Cross-Country Comparison of How Sharing Economy Firms Shape Their Institutional Environment to Gain Legitimacy

Uzunca, Bilgehan; Rigtering, J.P. Coen; Özcan, Pınar

doi:10.5465/amd.2016.0153

Cited by 148 publications

(177 citation statements)

References 70 publications

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“…Finally, this paper responds to multiple recent calls for more research on the sharing economy (Barczak, ; Gerwe and Silva, ; Luchs et al, ; Uzunca et al, ), in particular from an institutional perspective (Mair and Reischauer, ). Sharing economy research has thus far largely focused on the sharing economy platforms as new forms of organizing (e.g., Hinings et al, ) or value creation architectures (e.g., Cohen and Kietzmann, ; Muñoz and Cohen, ; Vaskelainen and Münzel, ), the motivation of individuals to join such platforms (e.g., Hamari, Sjöklint, and Ukkonen, ; Wilhelms, Henkel, and Falk, ), and their social and environmental impact (e.g., Parguel, Lunardo, and Benoit‐Moreau, ).…”

Section: Theoretical and Managerial Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 64%

Institution‐Infused Sensemaking of Discontinuous Innovations: The Case of the Sharing Economy

Weber

Lehmann

Graf‐Vlachy

et al. 2019

J of Product Innov Manag

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This paper adopts an institutionalist perspective to develop a better understanding of why incumbent organizations struggle to respond to discontinuous innovations. Based on a case study of the hotel industry’s early response to the emergence of “sharing economy” businesses, it identifies three patterns of “institution‐infused interpretation” in incumbent managers’ sensemaking—i.e., interpretations that are triggered by decision makers’ perceptions of the ways in which discontinuous innovations challenge established rules, norms, and taken‐for‐granted assumptions. First, as incumbent managers perceive new entrants that introduce the innovation as violating regulative and normative rules, they develop a sense of unfairness regarding the new competition enabled by the discontinuous innovation. Second, as new entrants deviate from normative and cognitive institutions, they cause collective confusion among incumbents. Third, perceiving discontinuous innovations as challenging regulatory and cognitive institutions, incumbent managers cognitively marginalize new entrants and their offerings as illegitimate and substandard niche phenomena. Interestingly, these institution‐infused interpretive patterns not only contribute to early incumbent inertia, but also motivate incumbents to question established rules and engage in institutional work. Overall, this paper adds to the emergent conversation on the role of institutions in organizational adaptation to discontinuous innovations by revealing the importance of institutional violations for managerial sensemaking and responses in this context.

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Section: Theoretical and Managerial Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 64%

Institution‐Infused Sensemaking of Discontinuous Innovations: The Case of the Sharing Economy

Weber

Lehmann

Graf‐Vlachy

et al. 2019

J of Product Innov Manag

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Policy makers willing to increase the supply in digital sharing platforms can focus more on regulating the PE (in terms of giving clear guidelines and clarity) rather than adopting a laissez-faire approach (cf. Uzunca, Rigtering, and Ozcan 2018).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These findings serve to inform policy makers in their debate on whether it is better to adopt a laissez-faire approach or regulatory interference to promote the growth of the PE (cf. Uzunca, Rigtering, and Ozcan 2018). As Miller (2016) underlines, an appropriate direction is still missing to address the regulation of the PE.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulation strictness and supply in the platform economy: the case of Airbnb and Couchsurfing

Uzunca

Borlenghi

2019

Industry and Innovation

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To what extent is regulation associated with supply in the platform economy (PE)? We address this research question by analyzing the relationship between the strictness of rules/laws in 59 U.S. cities and the number of short-stay accommodation offerings. We find that the stricter regulation is, the higher the supply in these platforms. We also investigate how the presence (or lack thereof) of money transactions in the platform affects this relationship. We discover that the presence of money transactions in these platforms negatively moderates the positive relationship between regulation strictness and the supply of short-stay accommodations. This paper contributes to the literature by investigating how aggregate supply in the PE is affected by legal uncertainties, thereby joining the debate on how digital platforms are reforming labor practices in major parts of the economy and industrial value chains.

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“…At the same time, Uber began engaging in lobbying activity, attempting to use revenue and investment to favorably reshape laws to accommodate sharing economy practices (Uber's lobbying spend reached $1.36m in 2016, (Centre for Responsive Politics, ). Additionally, the company used their resources to encourage customers to lobby lawmakers on the companies behalf to enact advantageous regulatory change (Uzunca et al, ). The key transformation phase of this legitimation process occurred between 2013 and 2014, where the valuation of the company rose significantly and the company capitalized on network effects to drive user growth on both sides of the platform.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Good to be bad: Should we be worried by the sharing economy?

Chalmers

Matthews

2019

Strategic Change

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We develop the notion of a legitimacy tipping point to demonstrate how informal economy practices are being utilized by innovative sharing economy ventures to gain a competitive advantage that is subsequently leveraged to reconfigure formal institutional arrangements. Companies who are able to scale rapidly can afford to contravene regulations, provided they have public support. When they reach a certain size, in terms of investment and customer numbers, regulators are forced into a reactive position where novel business models are legitimized. This raises an important question for regulators and entrepreneurs as to whether subverting business regulation is being viewed as a viable source of competitive advantage by scaling firms.

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Sharing and Shaping: A Cross-Country Comparison of How Sharing Economy Firms Shape Their Institutional Environment to Gain Legitimacy

Cited by 148 publications

References 70 publications

Institution‐Infused Sensemaking of Discontinuous Innovations: The Case of the Sharing Economy

Institution‐Infused Sensemaking of Discontinuous Innovations: The Case of the Sharing Economy

Regulation strictness and supply in the platform economy: the case of Airbnb and Couchsurfing

Good to be bad: Should we be worried by the sharing economy?

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