Sharing of Control as a Corporate Governance Mechanism

Gomes, Armando; Novaes, Walter

doi:10.2139/ssrn.277111

Cited by 145 publications

(181 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The findings support many scholars who are opponents of concentration of ownership and argue that concentration leads to expropriation of minorities and poor performance, for example Gomes and Novaes (2005), Burkart et al (1997), Laeven and Levine (2009). However, this result is against the view of ownership concentration is more effective and enhances monitoring and governance, for example; Shehzad et al (2010) and Iannotta et al (2007).…”

Section: Conclusion and Recommendationssupporting

confidence: 79%

“…It may even have negative effect because, for example, large shareholders may have different interests from minority shareholders and seek to achieve their own interests (Gomes and Novaes, 2005), exert expropriation threat (Burkart et al, 1997), and take higher risk as they have strong power and incentives to increase risk (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Further, Pi and Timme (1993) suggest that cost efficiency and return on assets are unrelated to institutional and large blockholders ownership.…”

Section: Ownership Structure and Bank Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

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Corporate Governance and Accounting Performance: A Balanced Scorecard Approach

ElBannan

Elbannan

2014

AFR

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Section: Conclusion and Recommendationssupporting

confidence: 79%

Section: Ownership Structure and Bank Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and Accounting Performance: A Balanced Scorecard Approach

ElBannan

Elbannan

2014

AFR

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“…In the case of firms with multiple controlling shareholders, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) and Gomes and Novaes (2005) predict that the controlling group should be larger and have a larger joint stake. In this way, it internalizes expropriating costs and minimizes the incentives for expropriation.…”

Section: Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, we should expect a relationship between changes in ownership structure and performance. Gomes and Novaes (2005) consider a setting in which the firm is controlled by a group of blockholders with veto power holding in aggregate the majority of the voting rights (controlling group). For a given ownership stake held by the controlling group, increasing the number of group members generates a bargaining effect as it makes coordination on private benefit and rent extraction less likely.…”

Section: Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some papers address how controlling groups are formed between large shareholders (Zwiebel, 1995;Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000) and their effect on monitoring (Pagano and Ro¨ell, 1998) and levels of private benefits extraction (Gomes and Novaes, 2005). However, little is known about how large shareholders interact and share their power and how the structure of the controlling group, i.e.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ownership structure and minority expropriation: the case for multiple blockholders

Gutiérrez

Tribó

Mariano

2012

Applied Financial Economics

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This article investigates minority expropriation in closely-held firms. Using a sample of Spanish firms for the period from 1996 to 2006, we find that firms that are more vulnerable to minority expropriation have blockholders controlling groups with aggregate equity stakes that are far removed from 50%, which is the point that maximizes the chances of expropriation. Moreover, performance improves when the controlling group's stake moves away from the region where expropriation is more likely -the alignment effect -and, if within this region, when the number of group members increases -the bargaining effect.

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The determinants of banks' credit risk: Review of the literature and future research agenda

Naili

Lahrichi

2020

Int. J Fin Econ

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Banks' credit risk, mostly conveyed by the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) and considered as a prominent threat to the banking sector stability, has been widely discussed among researchers and policymakers. Given the growing body of literature on this topic, this paper aims to provide a structured review of literature on the determinants of NPLs with a focus on the current dynamics of the field. This study discusses the main theories that shaped the debate on NPLs and their bank-specific, macroeconomic and industry-related determinants. A thorough understanding of these latter would enable policymakers, regulators and bank managers to anticipate banks' failures and, academicians to advance their research. To facilitate further knowledge in this field, this paper reviews 69 studies published between 1987 and 2019 in 40 peer-reviewed journals. We argue that despite the extensive empirical and theoretical work accomplished over the last decades, the issue of credit risk remains an unsolved line of inquiry, which leaves ample room for critical debates. Beside mapping the emerging discourse on this area, this study proposes a promising future research agenda to guide research advancement.

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Sharing of Control as a Corporate Governance Mechanism

Cited by 145 publications

References 8 publications

Corporate Governance and Accounting Performance: A Balanced Scorecard Approach

Corporate Governance and Accounting Performance: A Balanced Scorecard Approach

Ownership structure and minority expropriation: the case for multiple blockholders

The determinants of banks' credit risk: Review of the literature and future research agenda

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