Shifting Reputations for “Moderation”: Evidence from Qatar, Jordan, and Morocco

Sheline, Annelle R.

doi:10.1163/18763375-01201002

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…However, there is a noted lack of empirical research in this area [43]. The literature has explored numerous facets of reputation, such as reputational strategies in the policies of individual states [44], the application of the reputational approach to the study of European Union regulators [45], the management of reputations by anti-corruption agencies [46], the influence of reputation on the implementation of administrative policy control and accountability to representative bodies [47], the relationship between the effectiveness of anti-crisis communication strategies of public administration organizations and citizens' perception of their reputation [48], and the dependence of governmental institutions' reputation on the perception not only of the external but also internal audience, i. e., civil servants [49].…”

Section: Theoretical Basis Of the Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation core of Russian authorities: the case of the regional level of executive power

Rozanova

2023

Balt. Reg.

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The importance of studying the reputation of authorities is connected, on the one hand, with the formation of a consolidated system of political power and, on the other hand, with the highly social orientation of the category of the ‘reputation of authorities’, reflecting the value-based attitude of citizens towards them. The article presents the results of research aimed at the analysis of the reputation of Russian authorities, with a special focus on the regional branch of executive power. The paper examines the reputation of Russian authorities of different levels and branches using the example of regional executive bodies. The author determines the structure and features of the reputation core of the conceptual category ‘Russia’s authorities’ understood both as federal and municipal authorities of the Russian Federation as a whole. The article also offers a comparison of the reputation core of regional executive authorities with that of ‘Russia’s authorities’ in general. The methods used in this research are expert assessment and population surveys conducted in six regions of Central Russia. The study has revealed the main characteristics constituting the reputation core of executive authorities and described their specificity in different regions. Based on the results of the theoretical and empirical analyses, the author proposes a novel approach to defining the structure of the reputation core characteristic of the federal and regional executive authorities. The reputation core is a multi-component conceptual construct dominated by several integrating characteristics such as honesty, responsibility, justice, concern for and protection of citizens. No differences in the structure of the reputation core of the federal and regional executive authorities have been identified. However, the degree to which these characteristics manifest themselves varies. The reputation of regional authorities is assessed based on a system of values, expectations and the results of their work with the federal centre, citizens’ experience of communication with regional authorities and the assessment of their activity. The reputation of the regional executive authorities is characterised by lesser stability of the conceptual characteristics of the near periphery and greater dynamism of the outer conceptual boundaries, especially in specific regions.

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Section: Theoretical Basis Of the Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Reputation core of Russian authorities: the case of the regional level of executive power

Rozanova

2023

Balt. Reg.

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“…In this vein, Schwedler and Lynch (2020) highlighted Islamists' structural variations, ideological transformations, and inter-factional competition in response to national and transnational conditions. This operational and structural diversity prompted scholars to reject Islamists' exceptionalism while emphasising their distinct strategies leveraged for political survival especially after their delegitimisation in Arab countries following the 2013 military coup (Brooke 2014;Cavatorta, 2018;Joya, 2018;Kraetzschmar and Saleh, 2018;Sheline, 2020;Stein and Volpi, 2014;Wagemakers, 2020;Yadav, 2020). While al-Nahda and the Moroccan Justice and Development parties developed flexible and conciliatory strategies in compliance with national exigencies for sharing power, the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) witnessed intra-structural and ideological divisions among leaders and rank-andfile members.…”

Section: Scholarship On Islamists' Political Participationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The ‘incomplete’ failure of political Islam: The Justice and Development Party and the Freedom and Justice Party as case studies

Magued

2022

Politics

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How would Islamists succeed to sustain their rule in spite of their lack of an Islamic blueprint for governance? I draw on an original fieldwork study conducted in Turkey and Egypt from 2010 to 2013 to advance a theory linking Islamists’ rule sustainability and political leverage vis-à-vis the state establishment. In contrast with post-Islamism, the results contended that Islamists sustain their rule if they have a high political leverage based on the adoption of a three-fold strategy comprising identification, differentiation, and alliance mobilisation. Based on 45 open-ended and semi-structured interviews conducted with members of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party and Egypt’s Freedom and Justice Party, findings significantly hold in authoritarian and hybrid regimes in the Middle East.

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What (Who) Is Moderate Islam for? Malaysia's Ontological Security Seeking in the Post-September 11 Global Order

Chan

2023

Foreign Policy Analysis

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The popular yet ambiguous idea of moderate Islam has been treated with either interest or indifference in international relations. The interest hinges on hopes of Islamic reformism, whereas the indifference originates from a cynical view that sees moderate Islam campaigns as driven by political opportunism. These viewpoints conceptualize the idea of “moderate Islam” as exegetically rooted and seek to measure state actions based on that. This article argues that “Islamic” signifiers in the foreign policy narratives of Muslim states are better understood from the postcolonial subjectivities of their producers, who are most aware of uneven global cultural hierarchies. It demonstrates that elite Muslim narratives of moderate Islam are less about religious reformation as they are about ontological security seeking. This need for ontological security seeking by Muslim state elites stems from the historical stigmatization of Islam that is exacerbated by the Global War on Terror. Using the case of Malaysia, I highlight how discourses about moderate Islam in foreign policy operate through two mutually reinforcing discursive strategies: image building and image differentiation. Through historical and discourse analysis, I argue that both strategies contain a stigma-correction motive as they worked to craft this image of Malaysia being an exemplary “moderate” Muslim state.

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Shifting Reputations for “Moderation”: Evidence from Qatar, Jordan, and Morocco

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Reputation core of Russian authorities: the case of the regional level of executive power

Reputation core of Russian authorities: the case of the regional level of executive power

The ‘incomplete’ failure of political Islam: The Justice and Development Party and the Freedom and Justice Party as case studies

What (Who) Is Moderate Islam for? Malaysia's Ontological Security Seeking in the Post-September 11 Global Order

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