Acts of political violence carried out by Muslim individuals has generated international support for governments that espouse so-called “moderate Islam” as a means of preventing terrorism. Governments also face domestic skepticism about moderate Islam, especially if the alteration of official Islam is seen as resulting from external pressure. By evaluating the views of individuals that disseminate the state’s preferred interpretation of Islam—members of the religious and educational bureaucracy—this research assesses the variation in the resonance of official Islam in three different Arab monarchies: Oman, Jordan, and Morocco. The evidence suggests that if official Islam is consistent with earlier content and directed internally as well as externally, it is likely to resonate. Resonance was highest in Oman, as religious messaging about toleration was both consistent over time and directed internally, and lowest in Jordan, where the content shifted and foreign content differed from domestic. In Morocco, messages about toleration were relatively consistent, although the state’s emphasis on building a reputation for toleration somewhat undermined its domestic credibility. The findings have implications for understanding states’ ability to shift their populations’ views on religion, as well as providing greater nuance for interpreting the capacity of state-sponsored rhetoric to prevent violence.

The article examines the monarchies of Qatar, Jordan, and Morocco to demonstrate how specific policies and ideologies do not necessarily correspond with the label of “moderate,” which instead primarily reflects a reputational strategy. Prior to 2011, Qatar had cultivated an image as a relatively “liberal” Gulf monarchy, but although few policy changes occurred, after 2011 the emirate was seen as sponsoring terrorism. The government of Morocco developed a reputation for promoting “moderate Islam,” yet religious intolerance persists, while the Jordanian regime has focused less on cultivating a moderate image than previously. Government efforts to develop a specific reputation reflect strategic maneuvering for both international religious soft power as well as consolidation of domestic control. Combining nine months of ethnographic fieldwork involving interviews with government officials, religious bureaucrats, and embassy personnel, the paper offers insights into how the strategic use of reputation has shifted in the post-2011 context.

A majority of national mosques were built in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. Why did national mosque construction become important to Islamic states during this period, when it had not been a priority in earlier decades when many of these states achieved independence? This article suggests that national mosque construction was the result of political elites’ anxieties regarding the threat to regime stability posed by Islamist activists. Drawing on a mediumNdataset of all 25 states that recognized Islam as their official religion, the article shows that mosque construction increased after 1979 when political elites adopted a strategy of Islamic nation-building, with one expression of this strategy taking the form of national mosque-building in order to visually manifest the regime’s religious authority. In addition to mediumNanalysis, the article uses process tracing to examine national mosque building in three case studies, as well as interview data, to evaluate whether mosque construction achieved the desired effect of bolstering regimes’ religious legitimacy in these contexts. The findings have implications for understanding the use of symbolic religious structures as tools for nation-building that have often been overlooked due to the tendency to associate nationalism with secular visions of modernity.