Shifting standards and stereotype-based judgments.

Biernat, Monica; Manis, Melvin

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.66.1.5

Cited by 422 publications

(444 citation statements)

References 33 publications

(52 reference statements)

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“…Although the experiment necessary to support this line of reasoning has not been done, the results of the present studies can be seen as consistent with the shifting standards model (Biernat & Manis, 1994). Specifically, when observers judge "normal" male and female faces, as was the case in Hess et al (1997), then women's anger expressions are rated as less angry and men's smiles as less happy.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 87%

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Facial Appearance, Gender, and Emotion Expression.

Heß¹,

Adams²,

Kleck³

2004

Emotion

171

121

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Western gender stereotypes describe women as affiliative and more likely to show happiness and men as dominant and more likely to show anger. The authors assessed the hypothesis that the gender-stereotypic effects on perceptions of anger and happiness are partially mediated by facial appearance markers of dominance and affiliation by equating men's and women's faces for these cues. In 2 studies, women were rated as more angry and men as more happy-a reversal of the stereotype. Ratings of sadness, however, were not systematically affected. It is posited that markers of affiliation and dominance, themselves confounded with gender, interact with the expressive cues for anger and happiness to produce emotional perceptions that have been viewed as simple gender stereotypes.That men's and women's emotion displays differ in many ways is well established. Two differences in particular have been noted. First, women report smiling more and are considered by others to smile more than men, and second, men's displays of anger have been reported to be both more pervasive and are generally more acceptable (see Brody & Hall, 2000;Fischer, 1993). Even stronger than observed differences in emotional expressivity between men and women are the stereotypic expectations that individuals hold regarding such differences. These expectations are socialized early and can have dramatic consequences for the perception of emotion in others. For example, even children as young as 5 years tend to consider a crying baby as "mad" when the baby is purported to be a boy but not when it is purported to be a girl (Haugh, Hoffman, & Cowan, 1980). Also, Gaelick, Bodenhausen, and Wyer (1985) found that husbands tend to interpret the simple absence of smiling during a marital dispute as a sign of hostility on the part of their wives, whereas wives tend to interpret the simple absence of hostility displays by their husbands in such disputes as a sign of love. In this context, Hess, Blairy, and Kleck (1997) found that women's expressions of happiness were perceived as more intense and their expressions of anger and disgust as less intense than expressions of the same physical intensity shown by men. Thus, there is evidence from different domains suggesting that the stereotypical view of men's and women's emotional dispositions translates also into a bias in the perception of their emotions. That is, when men and women or boys and girls show the same expression, this may not lead to the attribution of the same emotion or to the same intensity of emotion.Although both certain differences in actual behaviors and differences in stereotypic expectations regarding male and female expressivity are well documented, the reasons for these differences remain unclear. Henley (1977Henley ( , 1995 as well as Hecht (1999, 2000) traced both to a power inequity between men and women. They suggest that women smile more and are expected to smile more because across time and cultures, women have had less power than men, and low social power is thought to be associated wit...

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 87%

“…The results reported here are obviously relevant to the shifting standards model (e.g., Biernat & Manis, 1994). This model proposes that social judgments are made according to standards or expectations, which may shift for members of different groups as a function of group stereotypes.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 59%

Facial Appearance, Gender, and Emotion Expression.

Heß¹,

Adams²,

Kleck³

2004

Emotion

171

121

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“…The most obvious potential connection between our results and existing theoretical accounts is to the shifting standards model of stereotype-based judgments (Biernat & Manis, 1994;Biernat, 2003). Shifting standards refers to adjusting the relative meaning of criteria when assessing members of different groups.…”

Section: Relevance To Prominent Theoretical Accounts Of Racial Judgmentsmentioning

confidence: 82%

An Unintentional, Robust, and Replicable Pro-Black Bias in Social Judgment

Axt¹,

Ebersole²,

Nosek³

2016

Social Cognition

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PRO-BLACK BIAS IN SOCIAL JUDGMENT 2 AbstractEmpirical evidence and social commentary demonstrate favoring of Whites over Blacks in attitudes, social judgment, and social behavior. In 6 studies (N > 4,000), we provide evidence for a pro-Black bias in academic decision-making. When making multiple admissions decisions for an academic honor society, participants from undergraduate and online samples had a more relaxed acceptance criterion for Black than White candidates, even though participants possessed implicit and explicit preferences for Whites over Blacks. This pro-Black criterion bias persisted among subsamples that wanted to be unbiased and believed they were unbiased. It also persisted even when participants were given warning of the bias or incentives to perform accurately.These results suggest opportunity for theoretical and empirical innovation on the conditions under which biases in social judgment favor and disfavor different social groups, and how those biases manifest outside of awareness or control. If there is one conclusion to draw from decades of research on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination in the United States, it is that Whites are treated more favorably than Blacks (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014;List, 2004;Pager & Shepherd, 2008). Historically, this is understood in the context of slavery, lynchings, segregation, and state-sponsored discrimination.But, evidence from late 20th and early 21st century research suggests that the effects persist, if in subtler, even unintentional forms (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;Nosek, Smyth et al., 2007). Whites exhibited associations, attitudes, or behaviors that favored Whites over Blacks, and two papers in which Whites had attitudes, associations or behaviors that favored Blacks over Whites.In the first instance of pro-Black behavior (Unzueta, Everly & Gutierrez, 2014), White participants reported greater liking for a Black than White person after each complained about experiencing discrimination. In the other instance (Galinsky, Hall, & Cuddy, 2013), a majorityWhite sample was more likely to choose a Black female than White female candidate for a leadership position within a company, though White males were preferred over Black males.That such a majority of the research finds preferences for Whites over Blacks is perhaps not surprising given that, on average, Whites show explicit and implicit preferences for Whites PRO-BLACK BIAS IN SOCIAL JUDGMENT

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“…For example, perhaps our Black experimenters were actually nicer people than our White experimenters and thus elicited more positive interactions. There is no way to equate, in an absolute sense, different people with different interactions, especially with subjective rating scales (see Biernat & Manis, 1994). The point is not whether one set of ratings (e.g., those for Black experimenters) is greater than another set of ratings (e.g., those for White experimenters).…”

Section: Inappropriate Claims About a Disconnect Between Iat Scores Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Weak criticisms and selective evidence: Reply to Blanton et al. (2009).

McConnell

Leibold

2009

Journal of Applied Psychology

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We respond to a critique by H. Blanton et al. (2009), challenging our previous work demonstrating that an Implicit Association Test designed to assess implicit prejudice reliably predicts intergroup discrimination (A. R. McConnell & J. M. Leibold, 2001). We outline 3 flawed aspects of the critique. First, we note that claims that an outlier should be eliminated from the original data set are unfounded, and even with the elimination of this outlier, the conclusions of our original work are still strongly supported by the data. Second, we explain that concerns about interjudge reliability are specious and that considerable data support the validity of the judges' observations reported in our original study. Third, we note that claims of a disconnect between Implicit Association Test scores (argued to show negative bias against Blacks) and behavioral measures (argued to show pro-Black bias) are inappropriate because they neglect the relativistic nature of the key measures. Implications for the relation between implicit attitudes and behavior, for the law, and for future work on implicit attitudes are discussed.Keywords: implicit attitudes, prejudice, discrimination, Implicit Association Test PrefaceWe are pleased to offer our thoughts on the Blanton et al. (2009) article. In July 2006, we were contacted by an author on that article (G. Mitchell, personal communication, July 25, 2006), who asked us for copies of the data sets for our publication, McConnell and Leibold (2001). Despite the fact that the request came 5 years after publication and 8 years after data collection, we were happy to comply. At that time, we inquired about the nature of the interest in our data (e.g., what hypotheses were being tested), but no specifics were offered. In February 2007, we received a summary of their analyses, and we informed them that it is our practice to not offer comments on work outside of the normal editorial review process. We were not provided with a copy of their manuscript until June 2008, when we were asked to write a commentary on it after it had been peer reviewed. Thus, this reply is our first opportunity to speak to a number of reservations we have about their work. Herein, we focus on three concerns that were especially striking to us, and we elaborate on the broader implications of this exchange. Selective Focus on a Single Dependent MeasureOne of the points made by Blanton et al. (2009) is that it is tenuous to make strong claims about relations between implicit attitudes and behavior based on a small amount of data. We agree that it would be preferable to see more studies demonstrate the implications of implicit attitudes for behavioral relations and, indeed, this was a primary motive behind our conducting the McConnell and Leibold (2001) study in the first place. One of the primary arguments marshaled by Blanton et al. against our work is that, in their view, our critical Implicit Association Test (IAT)-behavior demonstration hinges on 1 outlier participant, who revealed strong racial prejudice on the IAT (5...

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Shifting standards and stereotype-based judgments.

Cited by 422 publications

References 33 publications

Facial Appearance, Gender, and Emotion Expression.

Facial Appearance, Gender, and Emotion Expression.

An Unintentional, Robust, and Replicable Pro-Black Bias in Social Judgment

Weak criticisms and selective evidence: Reply to Blanton et al. (2009).

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