Emotional mimicry is the imitation of the emotional expressions of others. According to the classic view on emotional mimicry (the Matched Motor Hypothesis), people mimic the specific facial movements that comprise a discrete emotional expression. However, little evidence exists for the mimicry of discrete emotions; rather, the extant evidence supports only valence-based mimicry. We propose an alternative Emotion Mimicry in Context view according to which emotional mimicry is not based on mere perception but rather on the interpretation of signals as emotional intentions in a specific context. We present evidence for the idea that people mimic contextualized emotions rather than simply expressive muscle movements. Our model postulates that (implicit or explicit) contextual information is needed for emotional mimicry to take place. It takes into account the relationship between observer and expresser, and suggests that emotional mimicry depends on this relationship and functions as a social regulator.

Recent application of theories of embodied or grounded cognition to the recognition and interpretation of facial expression of emotion has led to an explosion of research in psychology and the neurosciences. However, despite the accelerating number of reported findings, it remains unclear how the many component processes of emotion and their neural mechanisms actually support embodied simulation. Equally unclear is what triggers the use of embodied simulation versus perceptual or conceptual strategies in determining meaning. The present article integrates behavioral research from social psychology with recent research in neurosciences in order to provide coherence to the extant and future research on this topic. The roles of several of the brain's reward systems, and the amygdala, somatosensory cortices, and motor centers are examined. These are then linked to behavioral and brain research on facial mimicry and eye gaze. Articulation of the mediators and moderators of facial mimicry and gaze are particularly useful in guiding interpretation of relevant findings from neurosciences. Finally, a model of the processing of the smile, the most complex of the facial expressions, is presented as a means to illustrate how to advance the application of theories of embodied cognition in the study of facial expression of emotion.

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Two studies provided direct support for a recently proposed dialect theory of communicating emotion, positing that expressive displays show cultural variations similar to linguistic dialects, thereby decreasing accurate recognition by out-group members. In Study 1, 60 participants from Quebec and Gabon posed facial expressions. Dialects, in the form of activating different muscles for the same expressions, emerged most clearly for serenity, shame, and contempt and also for anger, sadness, surprise, and happiness, but not for fear, disgust, or embarrassment. In Study 2, Quebecois and Gabonese participants judged these stimuli and stimuli standardized to erase cultural dialects. As predicted, an in-group advantage emerged for nonstandardized expressions only and most strongly for expressions with greater regional dialects, according to Study 1.