2008
DOI: 10.1080/17440570802543508
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Shifts in police–informant negotiations

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Cited by 9 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…The use of community‐based information, both paid informants and information that is volunteered, is a widespread element of criminal investigations within law enforcement and intelligence communities (Billingsley, Nemitz, & Bean, 2013). However, offering incentives for reporting information, such as money, or prosecutorial or judicial leniency, is controversial as it can lead to officer misconduct, and may encourage people to report crimes that never occurred or lie about the details for their own benefit (e.g., Boydell, 2017; Dunnighan & Norris, 1999; Harfield, 2012; Turcotte, 2008). Moreover, motivations for reporting crimes can also include revenge or a desire to put competitors out of action, as well as a sense of civic duty, and a desire to work alongside law enforcement (Dabney & Tewksbury, 2016).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The use of community‐based information, both paid informants and information that is volunteered, is a widespread element of criminal investigations within law enforcement and intelligence communities (Billingsley, Nemitz, & Bean, 2013). However, offering incentives for reporting information, such as money, or prosecutorial or judicial leniency, is controversial as it can lead to officer misconduct, and may encourage people to report crimes that never occurred or lie about the details for their own benefit (e.g., Boydell, 2017; Dunnighan & Norris, 1999; Harfield, 2012; Turcotte, 2008). Moreover, motivations for reporting crimes can also include revenge or a desire to put competitors out of action, as well as a sense of civic duty, and a desire to work alongside law enforcement (Dabney & Tewksbury, 2016).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, as the research by Fondevila (2013) in Mexico highlights, official management and control systems designed to structure the nature of relationships between the police and informants are often joined by different forms of unofficial , police-defined systems – including the use of coercive control to elicit intelligence about criminal environments from informants (see also Westmarland, 2013). Equally, there is some evidence, emanating from Canada, that informants can garner important skills and knowledge – especially in rule-tightening contexts – which they use to undermine handler authority (Turcotte, 2008). Finally, the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 further underlines the contemporary significance of studying police informants.…”
Section: State Of the Field And The Emerging Question Of Vulnerabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The ambition to proactively obtain information about crime, and the activities of suspects, remains a key objective of late modern policing, driving the use of undercover policing methodologies – including covert human informants (Maguire and John, 1995; Rowe and Sogaard, 2020). The police deployment of informants has a long history, both within the British policing tradition and elsewhere (Bunyan, 1976; Dunnighan and Norris, 1999; Ericson, 1982; Fondevila, 2013; Hobbs, 1991; Lowe, 2015; Marx, 1980; Miller, 2011; Natapoff, 2009; Turcotte, 2008). Whilst official police discourse justifies the use of informants as making an important – if not essential – contribution to the prevention and detection of crime, the employment of persons by the state to infiltrate the lives and organizations of those perceived as threatening to security is nevertheless morally ‘dirty’ (Klockars, 1985).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This can be attributed to the perceived need to protect attributes of tradecraft in this sensitive and confidential area of policing (South, 2001). What has been documented indicates that handlers need to master particular tactics that ensure safe engagement with human sources (e.g., defensive surveillance), and safe human source tasking and coordination (e.g., target profiling and rules of engagement such as ceasing criminal activity; Turcotte, 2008; Crous et al ., 2005). Research also indicates that the nature of the relationship between the human source and handler is fundamental to positive outcomes (South, 2001) and that effective relationships are characterised as being professional and reciprocal (Billingsley, 2004) and are based on mutual trust and respect (May and Hough, 2001).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%