Shop till you drop? Venue choices of business and non-business interests in the European Union

Abstract

The EU offers a variety of access points through which interest groups can attempt to influence policy-making. In this paper, we analyze differences in the use of these access points, or venues, by interest groups. Considering the roles played by different EU institutions along the policy cycle, we argue that the venues differ by the extent to which they encourage lobbying from different interest groups. Analyzing survey responses by more than 700 European interest associations, we find that the distribution of access-seeking by business and non-business actors differs across venues. Reflecting its pivotal role at the pre-proposal stage, the Commission encourages non-business organizations to spend much of their finite lobbying resources. In the context of the European Parliament, non-business groups are not only interested in influencing its decisions, but also in connecting to ordinary Members of the European Parliament. Business groups, for their part, apply greater resources to the rapporteurs. Finally, we show that business groups also allocate their resources to regulatory agencies at the implementation stage in the policy process, where incomplete legislative contracts are finalized and non-business groups’ resources are depleted.

Less complex language, more participation: how consultation documents shape participatory patterns

“…The common thread of the literature is that potential consultation participants are seen as rational, calculating the benefits and costs of participating (Pakull et al 2020;Røed and Wøien Hansen 2018;Sjoberg et al 2017).…”

“…The current literature either focuses on institutional features of the consultation, on the characteristics of the participants, or on the salience of the topic to explain variation in participatory patterns. Many studies find a dominance of business interests (Hermansson 2016), conditioned by policy characteristics , or the access rules (Beyers and Arras 2019;Pakull et al 2020). Most arguments are grounded in a rational actor model, with potential participants calculating the costs and benefits of consultation participation (Røed and Wøien Hansen 2018;Sjoberg et al 2017).…”

Lobbying and innovation in the European Union

“…The fragmentation of European institutions and the multiple layers of government provide vested interests with different access points through which they can exert influence. In a recent article, Pakull et al (2020) stress that the many different access points offer a variety of choices for lobbyists in the EU, especially nonbusiness groups. The shift of regulatory authority from national governments to Brussels and the introduction of qualified majority voting was met with a surge in lobbying activities at the EU level (Coen, 2007b).…”

Organized interests and trilogues in a post-regulatory era of EU policy-making

“…Table 5 documents the use made by political institutions of lobby organizations (55 statements) of behaviour of this type by the three EU decision making institutions, mostly by the European Parliament using NGOs to lobby the Council, once again providing strong evidence of the relationship between the EP, NGOs, and trade unions. This relationship receives little commentary in the literature on organized interests, so is worthy of investigation and analysis, and again helps to contribute to the debate about access to political institutions by organized interests (Pakull Marshall & Bernhagen, 2020). As might be expected given the traditional role of the Council in protecting economic interests in their member states, there were more examples of Council actors using business interests to lobby the EP than any other 63 3s) 3 (3sCategories denote possibility or the existence of CSO impact.…”