2003
DOI: 10.1016/s0304-3932(03)00081-3
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Should fiscal policy be different in a non-competitive framework?

Abstract: This paper studies if imperfections in the labor market justify a different fiscal policy. We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with a Ramsey planner deciding about public spending, labor taxes and debt. Two different labor market setups are considered. First we assume a competitive labor market and then we introduce a union with monopoly power.Both models reach the same conclusion as regards the cyclical properties of the optimal policy: it is not optimal to implement a countercyclical fiscal policy… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Then, these three equations, equation (8), the resource constraint (12), and the following condition:…”
Section: Appendix Bmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Then, these three equations, equation (8), the resource constraint (12), and the following condition:…”
Section: Appendix Bmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Following Lucas and Stokey (1983), under complete markets (22) is satis…ed with¸t =¸for all t. This, together with (21) implies that leisure and taxes are constant, say l cm = l t ; ¿ cm = ¿ t . From the budget constraint of the government at period zero we have…”
Section: Proofmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In order to ensure consistency with Section 2 we also compute the IRF by estimating an identical VAR (a Cholesky decomposition on the de…cit ratio, GDP growth and debt ratio) using simulated data to that we estimated in Section 2 on US data. We call 21 All models are solved using the Parameterised Expectations Algorithm described in den Haan and Marcet (1990). To solve the incomplete markets models we use the approach in Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä (2002).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A common assumption in most macroeconomic applications of dynamic optimal taxation is that a single representative good is consumed at each date. This is the case in Lucas and Stokey (1983), Judd (1985Judd ( , 1999, Chamley (1986), Zhu (1992), Jones et al (1993Jones et al ( , 1997, Chari et al (1994), Lansing (1998, 2006), Aiyagari et al (2002), and Gorostiaga (2003Gorostiaga ( , 2005. In this case, the tax rate on all consumption goods available at a particular date are implicitly equal.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%