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This paper studies if imperfections in the labor market justify a different fiscal policy. We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with a Ramsey planner deciding about public spending, labor taxes and debt. Two different labor market setups are considered. First we assume a competitive labor market and then we introduce a union with monopoly power.Both models reach the same conclusion as regards the cyclical properties of the optimal policy: it is not optimal to implement a countercyclical fiscal policy. We also find that government spending should be larger under perfect competition. These main results arise both under complete and incomplete markets for the debt.

This paper studies the implications for the optimal policy of introducing an exogenous minimum wage into a standard public finance model. I present a dynamic general equilibrium model with a Ramsey planner deciding about public spending, labor income taxes and debt. I find that for sufficiently high minimum wages, equilibria in which the labor supply is rationed and involuntary unemployment arises may be optimal in bad times. For a minimum wage not too high, the government will set taxes to reduce the labor supply and avoid non desirable rationing. This implies increasing taxes in bad times. As regards the cyclical properties of the optimal policy, state contingent returns on debt are used as shock absorbers so as to smooth private consumption over time and across states of nature.

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