“Should I Stay or Should I Go?” Explaining Political Ambition by Electoral Success in Brazil

Abstract

Why run for reelection when the logic and incentives of the political system leave no doubt that running for other offices is a better option? This paper focuses on the factors that influence both the choice of career and the electoral success of those who run for reelection and those who attempt to obtain other offices, using Brazil as a case study, a typically fragmented, multiparty environment with a strong executive. We argue that legislators run for reelection because it is the safest bet for them. The probability of winning is higher for those who attempt reelection than for those running for any other office. Because static ambition is conditioned by election results and not by the intrinsic desire to develop a career in the legislative branch, career paths do not necessarily lead to improvements in legislative professionalization and institutionalization. This finding contradicts theories that relate career paths to legislative institutionalization.

The Effect of the Electoral Calendar on Politicians' Selection into Legislative Cohorts and Legislative Behavior in Argentina, 1983–2007

“…With respect to the first point, we stress the importance of understanding legislators' alternatives. Even when a legislative seat is not particularly valuable, re‐election rates might be relatively high if legislators have little chance of obtaining a better office, as is the case in Brazil (Cunow et al ; Pereira and Rennó ). Indeed, our results indicate that much like their Brazilian counterparts, Argentine legislators only seek re‐election when they cannot afford a better alternative.…”

“…3 That is, we are interested in political behavior in a setting characterized by nonstatic ambition (Schlesinger 1966;Squire 1988): Given the chance, legislators prefer to "jump" to an executive position rather than continuing in the legislature. This is common in several Latin American countries, notably Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (Ames 2001;Chasquetti and Micozzi 2014;Cunow et al 2012;Jones et al 2002;Micozzi 2014aMicozzi , 2014bPereira and Renn o 2013;Power 2000;Samuels 2003). 4 To be sure, nonstatic ambition does not mean that legislative positions are without value.…”

Legislative Oversight of Brazilian Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Requests for Information and Summonses to Ministers, 1991-2014

“…There are two major lines of thought on this score. Some analysts, like Pereira and Rennó (2013), focus on the quest by members of Congress for re-election. They regard lawmakers as rational individual actors seeking to maximise their interests, and please their constituents.…”

Partidos políticos importam na definição de carreiras políticas no Brasil?

“…Para encontrar explicações sobre as escolhas de carreiras, os estudos enfatizam o comportamento dos políticos em duas arenas principais: na arena eleitoral e na arena de atuação no Estado, seja no Executivo ou no Legislativo. No que se refere aos deputados, federais ou estaduais, é comum a ideia de que a atuação legislativa, seja na proposição de leis, relatoria de projetos, ou trade for pork, está relacionada com os prospectos de carreira de cada político (SAMUELS, 2000;2003;RENNÓ, 2013;LEONI;RENNÓ, 2015). Outra forma comum de se analisar as escolhas de carreira dos deputados é observar sua atuação eleitoral dentro do distrito, seja pela busca de ampliação de sua base eleitoral, ou através de credit claiming por políticas defendidas ou pelos porks (na forma de emendas orçamentárias) direcionados a uma circunscrição territorial.…”