Signaling oriented denial of service on LTE networks

Bassil, Ramzi; Chehab, Ali; Elhajj, Imad H.; Kayssi, Ayman

doi:10.1145/2386995.2387024

Cited by 28 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Research from Virginia Tech [12] and other institutions [13] suggests that, due to the relatively small amount of LTE control signaling used by the LTE air interface protocols, this attack is possible. Further research is required to ascertain the level of complexity, severity, and probability of this attack succeeding.…”

Section: Jamming Ue Radio Interfacementioning

confidence: 99%

Guide to LTE security

Cichonski¹,

Franklin²,

Bartock³

2017

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AuthorityThis publication has been developed by NIST in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, 44 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130.Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other federal official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST. Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST.Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and provide feedback to NIST. Many NIST cybersecurity publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at https://csrc.nist.gov/publications. Comments on this publication may be submitted to:National NIST SP 800-187This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-187 Reports on Computer Systems TechnologyThe Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's respon...

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Section: Jamming Ue Radio Interfacementioning

confidence: 99%

Guide to LTE security

Cichonski¹,

Franklin²,

Bartock³

2017

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“…A DDoS attack example for future 5G mobile operator's core network can be the signaling amplification attack that 4G networks face and is described in (Bassil, 2012). This attack can be performed by a botnet of multiple infected mobile devices within the same cell in order to deplete the network resources leading to service degradation.…”

Section: --Signaling Amplificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, a low value for this threshold might lead to undetected exploits. Furthermore, a high number of bearer activations/deactivations per minute indicates malicious activity and should be discovered and stopped by the operator (Bassil, 2012), (Piqueras Jover, 2013). …”

Section: --Signaling Amplificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security for 5G Communications

Μαντάς

Komninos

Rodrı́guez

et al. 2015

Fundamentals of 5G Mobile Networks

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“…Many of these attacks have been studied recently [4,17,8]. Bassil et al simulated DoSbased signaling attacks over LTE, where the signaling overhead is exploited to prevent legitimate users from accessing the network [3]. Pelechrinis et al showed that DoS-based jamming attacks are possible at the MAC and PHY layers [13].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unveiling the hidden dangers of public IP addresses in 4G/LTE cellular data networks

Leong

Kulkarni

et al. 2014

Proceedings of the 15th Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications

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While it is often convenient for mobile cellular devices to have a public IP address, we show that such devices are vulnerable to stealthy malicious attacks. In particular, we show with experiments on three 4G/LTE cellular data networks in Singapore that it is easy for an attacker to initiate three different types of attacks on such mobile devices: (i) data quota drain, (ii) DoS flooding, and (iii) battery drain. Our experiments show that a potential attacker can completely exhaust the monthly data quota within a few minutes, completely choke the data connection of a mobile subscriber with a data stream of just 3 Mb/s, and increase the battery drain rate by up to 24 times. Finally, we argue that a simple proxy-based firewall with a secret IP address would be an effective and feasible defense against such potential attacks.

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Signaling oriented denial of service on LTE networks

Cited by 28 publications

References 6 publications

Guide to LTE security

Guide to LTE security

Security for 5G Communications

Unveiling the hidden dangers of public IP addresses in 4G/LTE cellular data networks

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