Signals of Reconciliation: Institution-Building and the Resolution of Civil Wars

Abstract

Recent studies of civil war have tended to apply concepts associated with neorealist analyses of international conflict to understand the dynamics of disputes among collectivities within a state. The intention of the present essay is to demonstrate that this reliance on neorealist theory has resulted in the neglect of viable solutions to these conflicts that are inconsistent with the dominant paradigm. We suggest that an alternative international relations perspective, neoliberal institutionalism, can also serve as a prescription for post-civil war stability. Consistent with this perspective, we identify a process in which negotiating and establishing power-sharing institutions serves two important functions in the resolution of civil wars. First, the institutions created through this process serve as the basis for establishing a new political order. Second, the act of developing postwar institutions provides a means by which former adversaries can generate the often costly signals of conciliatory intent necessary for fostering new norms of peaceful cooperation. We demonstrate the value of this framework through a case study of conflict resolution in the Philippines.

Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War

“… 12 For a similar argument on the costs of agreement and credible signaling, see Hoddie and Hartzell (2003). …”

“Sticking One's Neck Out”: Reducing Mistrust in Sri Lanka's Peace Negotiations

“…Using costly, conciliatory signals, she argues, would “either expose the sender to such danger that even peace‐loving groups would avoid using them or they are too easy to mimic by more Machiavellian groups to have the desired effect of relaying peaceful intentions” (Walter 1999: 136). On the other hand, Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell (2005) show how costly, conciliatory signaling was used in the internal conflict over Mindanao during the Philippine peace process in the mid‐1990s. In line with their findings, we suggest that conciliatory signaling may indeed be an important mechanism for initiating meaningful peace negotiations to solve internal, violent conflict.…”

“…According to the logic applied in this article, however, the presence of potential spoilers in a negotiation process does not necessarily have a one‐sided negative effect on peacemaking. Instead, the willingness by the parties to initiate negotiations in spite of spoilers can convey a powerful conciliatory message (see also Hoddie and Hartzell 2005).…”

Policing post-war transitions: Insecurity, legitimacy and reform in Northern Ireland

“…It is also the least stable (Doyle & Sambanis 2000;Toft, 2010). However, some scholars find that the specific features of a given peace agreement can be critical for overcoming the most significant challenges (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006;Glassmyer & Sambanis, 2008;Hoddie & Hartzell, 2005). Rather than simply "scraps of paper", the contents of peace agreements matter and have consequences for the durability of peace (Fortna, 2003).…”