Silencer or Amplifier? The European Union Presidency and the Nordic Countries

Abstract

How did the three Nordic European Union member states approach their periods as holders of the European Union (EU) Council Presidency? Two radically different predictions about the impact of the Presidency on member state behaviour can be found in the literature. Some maintain that the position functions as an amplifier, strengthening the already existing tendency to propagate national concerns. Others argue that the Presidency functions as a silencer, subordinating national material interests to the benefit of common European concerns. In this article we analyse the ways in which Finland, Sweden and Denmark actually performed the Presidency role. Which of the competing interpretations is most appropriate? Was the Presidency role performed differently by the three countries? Our main finding is that the Presidency generally functioned as an amplifier during the Nordic presidencies. There are, however, interesting differences between the three states, Denmark being the least constrained in using the Presidency to further national interests whereas Finland was most anxious not to violate norms of impartiality and neutrality, even in cases where such behaviour ran contrary to national interests.

Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?

“…which lack traditional power resources' (Bengtsson et al 2004, 314). Finland, for example, used its Presidency as a tool for achieving a more rewarding EU membership in the long run by promoting greater transparency, simplicity and efficiency in EU decision-making, as well as the Northern Dimension Initiative (Bengtsson et al 2004). Portugal used its Presidency in 2000 to push for the Common Strategy towards the Mediterranean and oversaw the first EU-Africa summit in conjunction with the Organisation for African Unity (Edwards and Wiessala 2001)-initiatives closely coupled to the country's own geopolitical location.…”

Assessing EU council presidencies: (Conditions for) success and influence

“…Some (Baillie, 1998;Bengtsson et al, 2004;Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006) have pointed out that small States can use the Presidency to increase their influence on decision making, but it is unclear whether small State Presidencies are more influential than large State Presidencies (Warntjen, 2007). Maurer (2008) argued that large State Presidencies are the most successful, because they have more resources to employ labour-intensive methods, and they can function independently of the Council Secretariat.…”

“…Ample attention has been paid to how small States can increase their influence through the office of the Presidency (Bunse, 2009;Arter, 2000;Bengtsson et al, 2004;Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006) and, more recently, to the role of the Presidency in the post-Lisbon institutional architecture. The edited volume of Charle´ty and Mangenot contributes to our understanding of the Presidency's relations with and current divisions of labour/power between the different actors in decision making.…”

Do Membership Benefits Buy Regulatory Compliance?

“…Relevant here are styles of conflict management, the complexity of legal procedures and norms of compliance, all of which can potentially facilitate and/or impede transposition. Indeed, legal characteristics -specifically, a low degree of litigiousness, procedural simplicity and norms of 'faithful compliance' -are said to explain the comparatively low number of infringement proceedings taken against the EU's Nordic states, particularly beyond the formal letters stage (Bengtsson et al, 2004;Bursens, 2002;Goldsmith and Larsen, 2004;Sverdrup, 2004). Table 2 provides summary descriptive variable statistics.…”

“…Countries that have been members of the EU for longer breach its laws more often than do more recently acceded countries (Giuliani, 2003;Mbaye, 2001). A number of possible explanations for this observed relationship exist, although perhaps the most plausible is that recent entrants are more eager to demonstrate their status as 'legitimate' members of the EU by fully complying with its rules (Bengtsson et al, 2004). As our measure of membership length we take the natural log of the number of years of EU membership, because the negative influence of EU membership length is unlikely to increase linearly with time.…”