Simulating policy interventions in the interfirm diffusion of low-carbon technologies: An agent-based evolutionary game model

Shi, Yingying; Han, Botang; Zeng, Yongchao

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.119449

Cited by 76 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…When the equilibrium point is E 0 (x = 0, y = 0, z = 0, θ = 0), the Jacobian matrix is written as Equation (33).…”

Section: The Stability Of the Four-dimensional Dynamic Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Research on Air Pollution Control in China: From the Perspective of Quadrilateral Evolutionary Games

Yang

2020

Sustainability

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By constructing a quadrilateral evolutionary game model involving the central government, local governments, polluting enterprises, and the public, this paper attempts to comprehensively analyze the development and implementation of China’s air pollution control policies. Through the quadrilateral evolutionary game model, this paper systematically studies the evolutionary stable strategies of the four parties involved and obtains 27 equilibrium points, strategy sets, and their corresponding policy performance with the help of the four-dimensional dynamic system. The research results show that there are five equilibrium points that represent the least ideal scenarios, 14 equilibrium points that represent the less than ideal scenarios, four equilibrium points that represent the ideal scenarios, three equilibrium points that represent the more than ideal scenarios, and one equilibrium point that represents the most ideal scenarios. By analyzing the eight equilibrium points that represent the ideal, more than ideal and most ideal scenarios, especially the four stable points, this paper has obtained the conditions as well as policy implications of the four stable points in China’s air pollution control campaign.

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“…When the equilibrium point is E 0 (x = 0, y = 0, z = 0, θ = 0), the Jacobian matrix is written as Equation (33).…”

Section: The Stability Of the Four-dimensional Dynamic Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Their results showed that all these policies turn out to be inefficient or even harmful to enterprises because of the adaptiveness of the whole system. Nonetheless, policymakers could choose measures to enlarge the size of green markets to solve the problem [33].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Air Pollution Control in China: From the Perspective of Quadrilateral Evolutionary Games

Yang

2020

Sustainability

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“…It was found that strengthening government supervision, encouraging technology adoption, and reducing supervision costs and technology adoption costs can promote technology diffusion. Shi et al [17] simulated the enterprise's response to the government's policy of promoting low-carbon technology and found the following: although carbon taxes, subsidies, and fines can promote technology diffusion, these measures were ineffective or even harmful to low-carbon companies.…”

Section: E Relation Between Government Support Policies Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution Dynamics of Agricultural Internet of Things Technology Promotion and Adoption in China

2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Internet of Things is the core technology of smart agriculture and can reform and upgrade traditional agriculture for reducing cost, reducing pollution, and increasing productivity and quality in China. From government-led and market economy perspectives, promotion mechanisms and sustainable adoption of agricultural Internet of Things technology are analyzed. In the initial application phase, the promotion of Internet of Things requires government support. For investigating the relationship between the government and farmers, this study builds an evolutionary game model and finds that increases of cost subsidy, farmers’ negative feedback, government’s positive feedback, and chemical agriculture cost can make the model evolve toward the strategy set: farmer adoption and government support. For long-term development, a sustainable model in competitive market is built by competition game and exponential replication equation. This paper analyzes the equilibrium of adoption ratio, long-run profit, and the conversion between equilibrium points under capacity sharing strategy in competitive market. It is also found that the market will eventually evolve to the technology selection strategy whose long-run average profit dominates the market. The innovations are that evolutionary game is used for analyzing the initial stage and competitive game and asynchronous update mechanism are used for analyzing the sustainable development adoption. At last, references are provided for agricultural Internet of Things development policy from the perspectives of initial promotion and long-run sustainability.

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“…Regional scientific and technological development will greatly promote the improvement of ecological green development [50]. High technology can improve the comprehensive utilization of resources and the ratio of input to output.…”

Section: Evaluation Index System Of Regional Ecological Green Coordinmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating Regional Eco-Green Cooperative Development Based on a Heterogeneous Multi-Criteria Decision-Making Model: Example of the Yangtze River Delta Region

et al. 2020

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The coordinated development evaluation problem of a regional eco-green cooperative can be formulated as a heterogeneous multi-criteria decision-making (HMCDM) problem. Evaluation information can contain qualitative information and quantitative information, but it cannot determine the weight of the interdependence criteria subjectively. Firstly, this paper constructs an evaluation index system for regional ecological green coordinated development. The system includes four dimensions of coordinated development: the regional ecological environment, economic environment, social environment and policy environment, including 20 indicators with heterogeneous and multi-attribute characteristics. Secondly, we construct a heterogeneous multi-attribute decision-making model by calculating the relative closeness, and use the closeness to construct the value function to determine the weight index of each attribute. Finally, we make an empirical study on the performance evaluation of regional ecological green coordinated development of 27 cities in the central area of the Yangtze River Delta in China. The results show that the main driving force for the improvement of the level of regional ecological green coordinated development is the high-quality economic development, and the main obstacles to the degree of coordinated development of regional ecological green development are high energy consumption, high pollution and high emissions in industrial development; and a result found by sorting the degree of the regional ecological green coordinated development in the Yangtze River Delta city group. The heterogeneous multi-attribute decision model we proposed can effectively solve the weights of the ecological green collaborative development indicators, and the method has feasibility and effectiveness.

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Simulating policy interventions in the interfirm diffusion of low-carbon technologies: An agent-based evolutionary game model

Cited by 76 publications

References 37 publications

Research on Air Pollution Control in China: From the Perspective of Quadrilateral Evolutionary Games

Research on Air Pollution Control in China: From the Perspective of Quadrilateral Evolutionary Games

Evolution Dynamics of Agricultural Internet of Things Technology Promotion and Adoption in China

Evaluating Regional Eco-Green Cooperative Development Based on a Heterogeneous Multi-Criteria Decision-Making Model: Example of the Yangtze River Delta Region

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