Simulating the Barriers of Transaction Costs to Public Rental Housing Exits: The Case of Wuhan, China

Li, Jintao; Ning, Xin; Sun, Jessie; Xiong, Xiaolu

doi:10.3390/su10051549

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…The four bursts may give us a signal that increasingly more scholars are focusing on the field of technology, sustainable science, and social sciences (see, e.g. Eichholtz et al, 2013;Kubicki et al, 2019;Ning et al, 2018).…”

Section: Analysis Of Categoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Real estate rental market: a 10-year bibliometric-based review

Liu

Peilong²,

et al. 2020

Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja

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Section: Analysis Of Categoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Real estate rental market: a 10-year bibliometric-based review

Liu

Peilong²,

et al. 2020

Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja

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“…Service charge significantly positively impacts the transaction cost of RCCL market. When an enterprise pays higher fees, the transaction cost increases [45,46]. Therefore, the openness, equity, and justice of the RCCL market transaction rules directly affect the market transaction environment, reducing the uncertainty of the institutionalized environment and lowering the enterprise cost in the transaction market.…”

Section: Tobit Model Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effect of Transaction Rules on Enterprise Transaction Costs Based on Williamson Transaction Cost Theory in Nanhai, China

Deng

An-lu

2020

Sustainability

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The high transaction costs due to the incomplete information and transaction rules of the rural collective construction land (RCCL) market indicate that the government must improve the rural collective construction land market. Transaction rules are an important means for the government to intervene in the market and promote the development of market order, to secure land tenure, and to improve the disclosure of information. Vertical integration may reduce enterprise transaction costs but will increase the governance cost of internal organizations in enterprises. Land commercialization and corporate governance restructuring is a considerable challenge worldwide. Using a field survey in Nanhai district, Guangdong province, China, we estimated how the transaction costs of the RCCL are influenced not only by three dimensions of transaction rules—openness, equity, and justice—but also by the human asset in EC or EJC. Tobit models were constructed, and the results show that (1) the greater number of collective leaders, the higher the enterprise transaction cost (human asset in EC or EJC increases transaction costs of enterprises) and (2) the transaction rules are not sufficiently open or fair, which leads to high costs of market information searching, opportunism, and corruption. The transaction information is not transparent and the lag in transaction supervision mode gives rise to unfair transactions, in which the formation mode of land price is unreasonable. Therefore, we suggest that the transaction rules of RCCL market should be further improved in the three dimensions of openness, equity, and justice. Chinese authorities should strengthen their current efforts to build a more open and fair market by reducing the transaction costs of enterprises and improving the transaction efficiency. Our work provides some insights into the improvement of market efficiency which will contribute to the development of the RCCL market in other areas of China and worldwide.

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“…On the contrary, the transaction cost will be larger, so the villagers will be more reluctant to participate in the RCCL market [28,29]. Rural collective construction land is in the pilot stage, and the transaction rules are not perfect, so the degree of transaction uncertainty (openness, fairness, and justice) is not enough [30][31][32]. The stronger the uncertainty of transaction rules, the more serious the opportunistic behavior and corruption, and the higher the transaction costs affecting villagers and the collective economic organizations' willingness.…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are Villagers Willing to Enter the Rural Collective Construction Land Market under the Arrangement of Transaction Rules?—Evidence from Ezhou, China

Deng

An-lu

Cheng

et al. 2022

Land

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In China, rural construction land refers to the construction land of townships (town) and villages. The construction land of townships (town) and villages refers to the land used by township (town) and village collective economic organizations and rural individuals to invest or raise funds for various non-agricultural construction. Rural collective construction land is divided into three categories: homestead, land for public welfare public facilities, and land for business. Complete market transaction rules can make the market of rural collective construction land run more openly, fairly, and justly, thus protecting the rights of villagers and collective economic organizations and, at the same time, reducing the transaction cost of the village collective. In this paper, we choose the formal rules of the urban and rural land linking quota trading market in Ezhou, Hubei Province, China, to analyze the three dimensions of the market transaction rules and villagers’ willingness. We also provide suggestions for the development of the RCCL market and the improvement of trading rules. The research results of the logistic model show the following: (1) Under the arrangement of the transaction rules of the RCCL, there are high transaction costs, especially labor costs and time costs, so the villagers’ willingness to enter the market is not very strong. (2) Asset specificity affects villagers’ willingness. The larger the area of RCCL involved in the transaction, the higher the transaction cost, the lower the villagers’ willingness to support the RCCL transfer. (3) The greater the uncertainty of the RCCL transaction environment—mainly due to the problems of the openness, equity, and justice of the transaction rules, which lies in the transaction information not being transparent and the income distribution and the pricing being unreasonable, resulting in villagers’ rights being denied—the more the villagers are unwilling to support the RCCL entering the market. Therefore, we suggest that more open, fair, and just trading rules of the RCCL market should be formulated to protect the security of villagers’ property rights. Moreover, the land value should be displayed reasonably, which can also standardize the good trading order and trading environment, thus making the market development more effective and stable. Our work provides some insights for improving the efficiency of the land market, which will contribute to the development of the worldwide RCCL market.

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Simulating the Barriers of Transaction Costs to Public Rental Housing Exits: The Case of Wuhan, China

Cited by 5 publications

References 28 publications

Real estate rental market: a 10-year bibliometric-based review

Real estate rental market: a 10-year bibliometric-based review

Effect of Transaction Rules on Enterprise Transaction Costs Based on Williamson Transaction Cost Theory in Nanhai, China

Are Villagers Willing to Enter the Rural Collective Construction Land Market under the Arrangement of Transaction Rules?—Evidence from Ezhou, China

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