Simulation of common pool resource field experiments: a behavioral model of collective action

Castillo, Daniel; Saysel, Ali Kerem

doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.12.014

Cited by 62 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Crowding-in is more rarely observed in field settings and CPR artefactual experiments. Castillo and Saysel (2005) show that external regulation triggers higher cooperation levels among fishermen on a Caribbean island, while Rodriguez-Sickert et al (2008) find that increasing sanctions and enforcement probability eventually yields to cooperation levels close to those under self-governing systems.…”

Section: Literature and Behavioral Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Motivation crowding in environmental protection: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

d’Adda

2011

Ecological Economics

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This paper examines how motivation, crowding and social image affect environmental conservation decisions. An artefactual field experiment conducted in Bolivia is used to reproduce the trade-off between individual and social benefits in natural resource use and test the effect of non-monetary and non-regulatory incentives on pro-social behavior for environmental conservation. The results show the presence of a social norm prescribing positive contribution towards environmental protection, and that external incentives have heterogeneous effects on pro-social behavior depending on how they influence reputation and self-image. The experimental results differ from those of analogous experiments conducted in the laboratory, and are instead consistent with those from field experiments on common-pool resource management. This fact suggests caution in generalizing conclusions, reached in the laboratory, to different settings and populations.

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Section: Literature and Behavioral Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Motivation crowding in environmental protection: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

d’Adda

2011

Ecological Economics

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“…Similarly, the IAC framework could inform System Dynamics models, where different agent types and the effect of their actions on the overall behaviour of the system could be tested (e.g. Castillo and Saysel, 2005). Fourth, the IAC framework is modular, i.e.…”

Section: Further Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards an improved understanding of farmers' behaviour: The integrative agent-centred (IAC) framework

Feola

Binder

2010

Ecological Economics

119

100

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An effective approach to research on farmers' behaviour is based on: i) an explicit and well motivated behavioural theory; ii) an integrative approach; iii) understanding feedback processes and dynamics. While current approaches may effectively tackle some of them, they often fail to combine them together. The paper presents the integrative agent-centred (IAC) framework, which aims at filling this gap. It functions in accordance with these three pillars and provides a conceptual structure to understand farmers' behaviour in agricultural systems. The IAC framework is agent-centred and supports the understanding of farmers' behavior consistently with the perspective of agricultural systems as complex Social-Ecological Systems. It combines different behavioural drivers, bridges between micro and macro levels, and depicts a potentially varied model of human agency. The use of the framework in practice is illustrated through two studies on pesticide use among smallholders in Colombia. The examples show how the framework can be implemented to derive policy implications to foster a transition towards more sustainable agricultural practices. The paper finally suggests that the framework can support different research designs for the study of agents' behaviour in agricultural and social-ecological systems Feola, G., Binder, C.R., 2010. Towards an improved understanding of farmers' behaviour: The integrative agent-centred (IAC) framework, Ecol. Econ. 69, 2323Econ. 69, -2333

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“…The results of the improved game models are consistent with the findings of Ostrom [1990] and Ostrom et al [1994], which were based on both real cases and lab experiments. The results suggest that besides external solutions and appropriating exploitation rights to avoid tragic outcomes, the CPR users have the potential of escaping the resource depletion trap [Castillo and Saysel, 2005] through developing cooperative institutions and collective actions that can enforce sustainable exploitation and development of the resource.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Within this school of thought, noncooperative game theory (the prisoner's dilemma game and the well-known Nash noncooperative stability definition (solution concept) [Nash, 1951]) provided a reasonable framework for illustrating the individualistic behavior of the parties to a CPR and exploring the resulting tragic outcomes [Madani, 2010]. To overcome the tragedy of the commons and avoid the inferior outcomes, two basic solutions have been suggested based on the complete rational decision maker paradigm: external regulations of extraction and appropriation of ownership rights [Castillo and Saysel, 2005].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative institutions for sustainable common pool resource management: Application to groundwater

Madani

Dinar

2012

Water Resources Research

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Beneficiaries of common pool resources (CPRs) may select available noncooperative and regulatory exogenous institutions for managing the resource, as well as cooperative management institutions. All these institutions may increase the long‐term gains, prolong the life of the resource, and help to escape the tragedy of the commons trap. Cooperative game theory approaches can serve as the backbone of cooperative CPR management institutions. This paper formulates and applies several commonly used cooperative game theoretic solution concepts, namely, the core, Nash‐Harsanyi, Shapley, and nucleolus. Through a numerical groundwater example, we show how CPR users can share the gains obtained from cooperation in a fair and efficient manner based on these cooperative solution concepts (management institutions). Although, based on their fairness rationales, various cooperative management institutions may suggest different allocations that are potentially acceptable to the users, these allocation solutions may not be stable as some users may find them unfair. This paper discusses how different methods, such as application of the plurality rule and power index, stability index, and propensity to disrupt concepts, can help identify the most stable and likely solutions for enforcing cooperation among the CPR beneficiaries. Furthermore, how the noncooperative managerial characteristics of the CPR users can affect the stability and acceptability of the different cooperative CPR management institutions is discussed, providing valuable policy insights for cooperative CPR management at community levels.

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Simulation of common pool resource field experiments: a behavioral model of collective action

Cited by 62 publications

References 16 publications

Motivation crowding in environmental protection: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

Motivation crowding in environmental protection: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

Towards an improved understanding of farmers' behaviour: The integrative agent-centred (IAC) framework

Cooperative institutions for sustainable common pool resource management: Application to groundwater

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