Site managers and safety leadership in the offshore oil and gas industry

O’Dea, Angela; Flin, Rhona

doi:10.1016/s0925-7535(00)00049-7

Cited by 243 publications

(143 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…O'Dea and Flin 47 surveyed 200 offshore installation managers (OIMs) in charge of 157 production platforms and drilling rigs in the UK oil industry. They found that while the OIMs acknowledged that a participative leadership style was best practice for safety leadership, the majority actually reported using more directive (telling/selling) styles.…”

Section: Middle Managersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leadership for safety: industrial experience

Flin

2004

Quality and Safety in Health Care

Self Cite

167

118

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Section: Middle Managersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leadership for safety: industrial experience

Flin

2004

Quality and Safety in Health Care

Self Cite

167

118

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“…For example, we know that for middle managers, some of the factors likely to promote a good safety climate within the organization are commitment and involvement, priority given to safety, decentralization of decision-making, positive interactions with workers, and management's humanistic actions and support, etc. (O'Dea and Flin, 2001). Their position as intermediaries between supervisors and supervisees requires FLMs to continuously make adjustments between these two occupational groups.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Safety climate, perceived risk, and involvement in safety management

Kouabenan

Ngueutsa

Mbaye³

2015

Safety Science

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a b s t r a c tThis article examines the relationship between safety climate, risk perception and involvement in safety management by first-line managers (FLM). Sixty-three FLMs from two French nuclear plants answered a questionnaire measuring perceived workplace safety climate, perceived risk, and involvement in safety management. We hypothesized that a positive perception of safety climate would promote substantial involvement in safety management, and that this effect would be stronger than the perceived-risk effect. We also expected that safety climate dimensions would have a different impact on involvement in safety management. Especially, we expected climate dimensions dealing with safety-related exchanges between managers and their supervisees to be more related to FLMs' involvement in safety management. As expected, perceived risk, as well as safety climate, was related to FLMs' involvement in safety management: the more they perceived risks as probable and serious for their supervisees, the more involved they got in safety management. Similarly, FLMs who perceived a good safety climate in their company reported getting more involved in safety management than did FLMs who perceived a poor safety climate. Moreover, the results showed that safety climate was the key variable because it completely mediated the effect of perceived risk on involvement in safety management. Another important result showed that immediate supervisor encouragement was more influential than senior management views on safety. Furthermore, the fact of being called upon by supervisees on safety issues prompted the FLMs to be more involved in safety management. Possible avenues for improving the involvement of FLMs in safety management are suggested.

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“…Each of these categories is further divided into between three and five specific skills. This O'Connor and Flin framework was based on research into human factors carried out in the offshore oil industry (e.g., Flin, Mearns, Gordon, & Fleming, 1996;O'Dea & Flin, 2001;Parkes, 1992;Rundmo, 1994) and the NOTECHS behavioral marker system.…”

Section: Diving Fatality Reportsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Methodology for Identifying Human Error in U.S. Navy Diving Accidents

O’Connor

O’Dea²,

Melton³

2007

Hum Factors

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Objective: To better understand how human error contributes to U.S. Navy diving accidents. Background: An analysis of 263 U.S. Navy diving accident and mishap reports revealed that the human factors classifications were not informative for further analysis, and 70% of mishaps were attributed to unknown causes; only 23% were attributed to human factors. Method: Five diving fatality reports were examined using the consensual qualitative research (CQR) method to develop a taxonomy of six categories and 21 subcategories for classifying human errors in diving. In addition, 15 critical incident technique (CIT) interviews were conducted with U.S. Navy divers who had been involved in a diving accident or near miss and analyzed using the dive team error taxonomy. Results: Overall, failures in situation awareness and leadership were the most common human errors made by the dive team. Conclusion: The dive team human error taxonomy could aid in accident investigation and in the training and evaluation of U.S. Navy divers. Application: The development of the dive team human error taxonomy has generated a number of considerations that researchers should take into account when developing, or adapting, an error taxonomy from one industry to another.

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Site managers and safety leadership in the offshore oil and gas industry

Cited by 243 publications

References 18 publications

Leadership for safety: industrial experience

Leadership for safety: industrial experience

Safety climate, perceived risk, and involvement in safety management

A Methodology for Identifying Human Error in U.S. Navy Diving Accidents

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