Skeptical arguments from underdetermination

Yalçın, Ümit D.

doi:10.1007/bf00354467

Cited by 102 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…The skeptic can still raise many objections to particular propositions about the external world, such as h. For instance, some epistemologists (Brueckner 1994;Vogel 2004;Yalçin 1992) have considered a formulation of the skeptical argument that is based on the principle of underdetermination instead of the principle of closure. The relation between these two formulations of the skeptical argument is not straightforward.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts

Moretti

Shogenji

2017

Int J Study Skept

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This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition and proposes an explanation of why we have a faulty intuition. The second response, which we favor, accommodates all three intuitions; it reconciles the first and the third intuition by the dual component model of justification, and defends the second intuition by distinguishing two principles of epistemic closure.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts

Moretti

Shogenji

2017

Int J Study Skept

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“…An endorsement of this principle, however, only leads to scepticism on the assumption that my perceptual evidence is the same whether I am a BIV or not, an assumption that very clearly relies on IA. Hence, in this case too, IA is the culprit, not UP (for a good exposition of how UP (on the assumption that IA is true) leads to radical scepticism, see Yalcin (1992); for more discussion on the relation between UP and closure, see Pritchard (2005).…”

Section: Scepticism and The 'Default View'mentioning

confidence: 99%

The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments

Schönbaumsfeld

2017

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

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It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to 'closurebased' sceptical arguments, and, hence, to the 'scepticism or closure' dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-friendly moves are made before the closure principle is even brought into play. If we cannot avoid the sceptical conclusion, this is not due to closure's holding it in place, but because we've already been persuaded to accept a certain conception of perceptual reasons, which both issues a standing invitation to radical scepticism and is endemic in the contemporary literature. Once the real villain of the piece is exposed, it will become clear that the closure principle has been cast in the role of scapegoat in this debate.

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“…5 The problem of "knowing less by knowing more" is developed and discussed in Harman 1973, Ginet 1980 This is a generalization of the lottery puzzle, which was discovered by Kyburg 1961, and has been widely discussed since. 7 Recent discussions of the role of underdetermination considerations in motivating skepticism include Vogel 1990, Yalçin 1992, Brueckner 1994, Cohen 1998a. 8 Cohen 1988 develops these two conditions of adequacy on a solution to Closure.…”

Section: How This Analysis Solves Our Puzzlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…7 Recent discussions of the role of underdetermination considerations in motivating skepticism includeVogel 1990, Yalçin 1992, Brueckner 1994, Cohen 1998a Cohen 1988 develops these two conditions of adequacy on a solution to Closure. 9 InSchiffer 1996, Feldman 1999, Hofweber 1999, Klein 2000, Sosa 2000, Prades 2000, and Rysiew forthcoming.…”

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confidence: 99%