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PreliminariesThe so-called underdetermination thesis appears easy to formulate-let me give you two quick and easy formulations in Quine's idiosyncratic style:If by some oracle the physicist could identify outright all the truths that can be said in common-sense terms about ordinary things, still his separation of statements about molecules into true and false would remain largely unsettled. We can imagine him partly settling that separation by what is vaguely called scientific method: by considerations of simplicity of the joint theory of ordinary things and molecules. But conceivably the truths about molecules are only partially determined by any ideal organon of scientific method plus all the truths that can be said in common-sense terms about ordinary things; for in general the simplest possible theory to a given purpose need not be unique. ͑Quine 1960, pp. 21-22͒ Physical theories can be at odds with each other and yet compatible with all possible data even in the broadest sense. In a word, they can be logically incompatible and empirically equivalent. This is a point on which I expect wide agreement, if only because the observational criteria of theoretical terms are commonly so flexible and fragmentary. ͑Quine 1970a, p. 179͒The problem that arises from underdetermination is initially an epistemological problem: what to say about justification and knowledge when all possible evidence leaves us with a tie for first place. 1 But the epistemology is intertwined with metaphysics ͑or what some of us would call metaphysics͒. One is tempted to avoid the epistemological problem by "fine-tuning" one's worldview elsewhere. Thus, such "fine-tuning" operations on notions of truth, meaning and reality lead to metaphysical systems far removed from the naive realism of common sense 2 : we end up with esoteric positions such as instrumental-NOÛS 35:3 ͑2001͒ 394-418

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It is fair to say that the main debate in the philosophy of science in the second half of the twentieth century has been a debate on relativism. More precisely, it has been a debate on whether the scientific quest culminates in a relativistic world-view. We all know the principal actors, pro and con: Hanson, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Goodman, Rorty and Putnam, amongst many others. Ironically, some in this list who have been critics of relativism, have been chastised, in turn, for harbouring theses with relativistic implications.A historian of the period might remark that Quine, the dean of Anglo-American philosophy of science in the same period, has contributed very little to this debate. Quine's overall attitude seems to be that relativism is obviously an untenable position, and he will have nothing to do with it. When the occasion arises, he presents us with a sketchy refutation of relativism, and assures us that there are better alternatives (1960, 1975). And then, when all appears to be quiet on the relativism front, he suddenly announces that his '' . . . view of science involves both relativistic and absolutistic strains'' (1984, p. 294), and caps his short investigation of such strains with what appears to be a challenge: I was showing that scientific discourse radically unlike our own, structurally and ontologically, could claim equal evidence and that we are free to switch. Still we can treat of the world and its objects only within some scientific idiom, this or another; there are others, but none higher. Such, then, is my absolutism. Or does it ring relativistic after all? (p. 295) Does this indicate a sudden shift in the way Quine views his philosophy? I don't believe so. For years, Quine has been aware of certain aspects of his philosophy that seem to have relativistic implications. Thus, already in Word and Object, he asks: ''Have we now so far lowered our sights as to settle for a relativistic doctrine of truthrating the statements of each theory as true for that theory, and brooking no higher criticism?' ' (1960, p. 24) But since he has always been convinced that relativism is a dead end, he has sought for alternatives. Whether he really believed that there were readily available alternatives, or whether he has been hoping that some saving alternative would materialize, is a matter for pure speculation.