Solutions and Dissolutions of the Underdetermination Problem

Abstract

PreliminariesThe so-called underdetermination thesis appears easy to formulate-let me give you two quick and easy formulations in Quine's idiosyncratic style:If by some oracle the physicist could identify outright all the truths that can be said in common-sense terms about ordinary things, still his separation of statements about molecules into true and false would remain largely unsettled. We can imagine him partly settling that separation by what is vaguely called scientific method: by considerations of simplicity of the joint theory of ordinary things and molecules. But conceivably the truths about molecules are only partially determined by any ideal organon of scientific method plus all the truths that can be said in common-sense terms about ordinary things; for in general the simplest possible theory to a given purpose need not be unique. ͑Quine 1960, pp. 21-22͒ Physical theories can be at odds with each other and yet compatible with all possible data even in the broadest sense. In a word, they can be logically incompatible and empirically equivalent. This is a point on which I expect wide agreement, if only because the observational criteria of theoretical terms are commonly so flexible and fragmentary. ͑Quine 1970a, p. 179͒The problem that arises from underdetermination is initially an epistemological problem: what to say about justification and knowledge when all possible evidence leaves us with a tie for first place. 1 But the epistemology is intertwined with metaphysics ͑or what some of us would call metaphysics͒. One is tempted to avoid the epistemological problem by "fine-tuning" one's worldview elsewhere. Thus, such "fine-tuning" operations on notions of truth, meaning and reality lead to metaphysical systems far removed from the naive realism of common sense 2 : we end up with esoteric positions such as instrumental-NOÛS 35:3 ͑2001͒ 394-418

“Plausible insofar as it is intelligible”: Quine on underdetermination

“…Accordingly, the set of entities and principles posited by each must differ somehow. Thus the 4 Gibson (1986), Bergström (1993), andYalçin (2001), for example, maintain that it is a symptom not merely of a tension in his philosophy but of an outright inconsistency-although Gibson is less critical in a later work (1988, pp. 113-124).…”

Underdetermination and the Argument From Indirect Confirmation

“…4 4 The issue of what should count as (conceptual) difference is recently discussed by Yalcin (2001). …”

“…Grunbaum (1960) and(1962). 4 The issue of what should count as (conceptual) difference is recently discussed by Yalcin (2001 Poincaré's insightful solution is constructive: it consists in effectively specifying two seemingly incompatible but empirically equivalent theories describing the geometrical structure of physical space. The existence of examples such as Poincaré's shows that the reliance of the anti-underdetermination arguments on the lack of non-trivial alternatives is unconvincing.…”