Skepticism: The Hard Problem for Indirect Sensitivity Accounts

Melchior, Guido

doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9432-9

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“… 1 I argue in (Melchior 2014a ) that DeRose’s ( 1995 , 2010 ) indirect sensitivity account also suffers from this problem. DeRose uses the sensitivity principle for explaining our intuitions about knowledge, although he does not directly build a sensitivity condition into the concept of knowledge.…”

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Sensitivity has Multiple Heterogeneity Problems: a Reply to Wallbridge

Melchior

2017

Philosophia

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In this paper, I defend the heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge against an objection that has been recently proposed by Wallbridge in Philosophia (2016b). I argue in (Melchior in Episteme, 12(4), 479–496, 2015) that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face a heterogeneity problem when it comes to higher-level knowledge about the truth of one’s own beliefs. Beliefs in weaker higher-level propositions are insensitive, but beliefs in stronger higher-level propositions are sensitive. The resulting picture that we can know the stronger propositions without being in a position to know the weaker propositions is too heterogeneous to be plausible. Wallbridge objects that there is no heterogeneity problem because beliefs in the weaker higher-level propositions are also sensitive. I argue against Wallbridge that the heterogeneity problem is not solved but only displaced. Only some beliefs in the weaker higher-level propositions are sensitive. I conclude that the heterogeneity problem is one of a family of instability problems that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face and that Wallbridge’s account raises a further problem of this kind.

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Sensitivity has Multiple Heterogeneity Problems: a Reply to Wallbridge

Melchior

2017

Philosophia

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“… See Melchior . For a more a general criticism of sensitivity‐based analyses of the bootstrapping problem see Melchior .…”

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“…This version of coherentism does not accept basic knowledge, but it accepts knowledge about the reliability or trustworthiness of source without knowledge from an additional source. SeeMelchior (2012).EASY KNOWLEDGE, CLOSURE FAILURE, OR SKEPTICISM…”

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Easy Knowledge, Closure Failure, or Skepticism: A Trilemma

Melchior

2016

Metaphilosophy

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This article aims to provide a structural analysis of the problems related to the easy knowledge problem. The easy knowledge problem is well known. If we accept that we can have basic knowledge via a source without having any prior knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source, then we can acquire knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source too easily via information delivered by the source. Rejecting any kind of basic knowledge, however, leads into an infinite regress and, plausibly, to skepticism. The article argues that the third alternative, accepting basic knowledge but rejecting easy knowledge, entails closure failure. This is obviously the case for deductive bootstrapping, but, notably, the problem also arises for inductive bootstrapping. Hence, the set of problems related to the easy knowledge problem has the structure of a trilemma. We are forced to accept easy knowledge, closure failure, or skepticism.

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“…23 For a more detailed criticism of DeRose's indirect sensitivity account that does not focus on bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning see Melchior (2014b). 24 For a discussion of how to individuate belief-forming methods correctly in the context of sensitivity accounts see Becker (2012).…”

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“…23For a more detailed criticism of DeRose's indirect sensitivity account that does not focus on bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning see Melchior (2014b). …”

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The Heterogeneity Problem for Sensitivity Accounts

Melchior¹

2015

Episteme

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Offering a solution to the skeptical puzzle is a central aim of Nozick's sensitivity account of knowledge. It is well-known that this account faces serious problems. However, because of its simplicity and its explanatory power, the sensitivity principle has remained attractive and has been subject to numerous modifications, leading to a 'second wave' of sensitivity accounts. I will object to these accounts, arguing that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face two problems. First, they deliver a far too heterogeneous picture of higherlevel beliefs about the truth or falsity of one's own beliefs. Second, this problem carries over to bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning. Some beliefs formed via bootstrapping or Moorean reasoning are insensitive, but some closely related beliefs in even stronger propositions are sensitive. These heterogeneous results regarding sensitivity do not fit with our intuitions about bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning. Thus, neither Nozick's sensitivity account of knowledge nor any of its modified versions can provide the basis for an argument that bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning are flawed or for an explanation why they seem to be flawed.

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Skepticism: The Hard Problem for Indirect Sensitivity Accounts

Cited by 8 publications

References 9 publications

Sensitivity has Multiple Heterogeneity Problems: a Reply to Wallbridge

Sensitivity has Multiple Heterogeneity Problems: a Reply to Wallbridge

Easy Knowledge, Closure Failure, or Skepticism: A Trilemma

The Heterogeneity Problem for Sensitivity Accounts

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