Social Assistance Policies and Decentralization in the Countries of Southern Europe

Explaining Italian “exceptionalism” and its end: Minimum income from neglect to hyper‐politicization

“…For these reasons, other scholars looked at the positions of relevant interest groups. Saraceno (2006) suggested that, in Italy, the focus should be posed on the limited trade unions' interest in MIS. Consistently, other scholars have emphasized that the weak support by key social actors – religious organizations and trade unions primarily – constrained (also leftist) governments' interest in introducing a MIS in Italy since, under these conditions, the chances to “claim credit” are very limited (Lalioti, 2016; Natili, 2018).…”

“…Especially after the so called “Treu” reform de‐regulated “at the margin” the Italian labour market (Jessoula & Alti, 2010), proposals to strengthen non‐contributory benefits entered the political arena. However, powerful social actors rarely, and timidly, supported them: on the one hand, religious and social actors remained rather unenthusiastic about MIS (Lalioti, 2016; Saraceno, 2006), on the other, trade unions were divided and generally reluctant to support targeted benefits. In particular, the moderate union CISL was among the firmest opponents of a MIS, arguing that income support measures should be restricted to workers, whereas it is the duty of society as a whole – especially households and faith‐based organizations – to tackle poverty, not a government's responsibility.…”

“…Indeed, the comparative welfare state literature has recently shown particular interest in understanding the reasons behind Italian exceptionalism. Scholars have aimed to identify the factors behind the lack of a minimum income scheme in the traditional Italian welfare state configuration (Sacchi & Bastagli, 2005; Saraceno, 2006), as well as why in the so‐called “recalibration” phase (1992–2013) minimum income schemes were introduced and then almost immediately repealed (Jessoula et al, 2014; Kevins, 2015; Lalioti, 2016; Natili, 2018); finally, why, more recently, minimum income schemes have reached the very centre of the political debate (Durazzi, Fleckenstein, & Lee, 2018; Gori, 2020; Natili, 2019; Sacchi, 2018; Vesan & Ronchi, 2019).…”

The politics of safety net reform in Southern Europe during the Great Recession: Introduction to the regional issue

“…Southern European countries have long been considered as stragglers in this respect (Ferrera, 1996, 2005b; Gough, 1996, 2001; Nelson, 2011; Saraceno, 2006). The lack of a minimum income was considered part of a more complex set of features (Gutiérrez, 2014) that included dualistic labour markets with low employment rates for women and the young, and welfare systems with low redistributive capacity, biased in favour of the elderly and against the young, and chronically unable to reduce poverty significantly.…”

The guaranteed minimum income in Portugal: A universal safety net under political and financial pressure

“…Ferrera (2005) evokes the role of the family solidarity in these countries, compensating for the lack of public policies, the working of an underground economy, compensating for the lack of resources from the formal labour market, and the low administrative capacities in these countries to deliver such a means‐tested social transfers. Saraceno (2006) adds two other factors: on the one hand, the regional concentration of poverty, that had constrained the creation, at the national level, of a minimum income protection measure, and on the other hand the traditional opposition, by the trade unions, to the creation of such measure, since employment and wages, not assistance benefits, are the focus of policy negotiations.…”