Social Choice Rules, Fallback Bargaining, and Related Games in Common Resource Conflicts

Bahrini, Aram; Riggs, Robert J.; Esmaeili, Maryam

doi:10.1016/j.jhydrol.2021.126663

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 85 publications

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“…In terms of measuring mutual effects between actors, cooperative game theory is considered an effective and valid method for equitably distributing costs and benefits to ensure system stability and sustainability [47]. Two well-known subclasses of cooperative games are the social choice rule (SCRs) and fallback bargaining rule (FB) classes (Figure 2) [48,49].…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Social Choice Rules (SCRs) studies the rules of choice in situations where, first, multiple decision makers have different and sometimes conflicting preferences regarding possible choices for themselves and, second, intend to make group decisions instead of individual decisions [39,48,53,54]. The purpose of the concepts in this theory is to combine the preferences of decision makers in such a way that they are reflected as equally and fairly as possible in the group preferences [55].…”

Section: Social Choice Rules (Scrs) Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Then, it is assumed that each negotiator starts with the option he or she prefers the most (maximum preference) and insists on it. The negotiating parties then gradually and progressively withdraw from their positions to reach an agreed solution [48].…”

Section: Unanimous Evasion Negotiations (Ufb)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal Politics of Conflict over Physical-Industrial Development Using a Technique of Cooperative Game Theory in Iran

2021

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One of the most important parameters for economic growth is industrial development in many developing regions like Iran. The Markazi province in the center of Iran is one of the most important industrial areas in the country, where unplanned economic development in recent decades has led to many social and environmental problems. Accordingly, the main organizations involved in industrial development in this region are facing difficulties in the future development of industrial areas, which has become a complex problem. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to study the industrial development dispute in the Markazi province through a cooperative model of game theory in order to achieve conflict resolution through a comprehensive approach. In this research, the conflict has been analyzed through strategic analysis of stakeholders. For this purpose, a model of cooperative game theory and its bargaining analysis methods, including social choice rules (SCRs) and fallback bargaining (FB), and six available options were used. According to the six SCRs, the most likely option that can exist between the Department of the Environment (DOE) and the Industrial and Mining Organization (IMO) is compromise coordination (C). In addition, the results of the Fallback Bargaining (FB) rule in three different forms show that the most appropriate options for agreement between the IMO and DOE are the moderate version of construction through arbitration (TCa) and compromise coordination (C). In fact, the results indicate that if the actors involved in this conflict do not cooperate to resolve it, it can lead to more complex problems and the involvement of other groups who may not even have a proper perception of the conflict. In addition, the findings show that cooperation between the parties and understanding of their positions and views along with the policy coherence are necessary to strive for sustainable development and maintain economic growth and development.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%