Social Construction of Pastureland: Changing Rules and Resource-Use Rights in China and Kyrgyzstan

Abstract

A fundamental problem in governing natural resources is how to design institutions, particularly property rights regimes, that support sustainable use and management of common property resources. Privatization of natural resources was a widespread solution to the "tragedy of the commons" during the 1980s and 1990s. But many such efforts failed to achieve sustainable use of resources, and policymakers are now experimenting with new types of policy interventions. We examine recent changes in pastoral institutions and their outcomes regarding resource-use rights and the sustainability of resource use in China and Kyrgyzstan. Interpreting changing property rights as a process of social construction, we examine altered rules and rights relations and the ensuing changes in legal correlates between various actors in selected choice settings. The article contributes to the literature regarding the impacts of such reforms on property rights and their development in pastoral contexts.

Networks of action situations: a systematic review of empirical research

“…These dynamic relationships can look significantly different, however, if the analyst adds a third AS to generate a triadic network structure-for example, adding a collective choice AS where rules of provision or appropriation are endogenously adopted (Zikos et al 2010). More generally, such collective choice situations can help analysts to understand the effects of endogenous institutional change (Rommel 2015;Yu and Kasymov 2020). The study of such AS dyads and triads helps to systematically identify and study their dynamics within a larger NAS, as well as to unpack the way that additional ASs may affect relationships within AS dyads of interest.…”

Editorial: Introducing “Transformation in Common-Pool Resources Management in Central Asia”

“…Privatization and decentralization reforms in study regions in China and Kyrgyzstan transformed key formal rules in pasture use and have had profound effects on property rights relations among actors, reshaping resource use and management of CPRs. In the article that opens our Special Feature, Yu and Kasymov (2020) empirically examine these relationships. In doing so, they follow Bromley (1992), who offers an important perspective regarding the relationships between institutions and property rights: institutions are seen as "sets of rules, and property rights are a special class of institutions" (Yu and Kasymov, 2020: 4).…”

“…First, Yu and Kasymov (2020) contribute to the ongoing discourse by clarifying the relationship between alteration of rules and their effects on property rights and duties in the context of pasture use and management. Changing rules and property rights reshapes the flows of benefit and cost streams between actors.…”