Social Context Congestion Games

Bilò, Vittorio; Celi, Alessandro; Flammini, Michele; Gallotti, Vasco

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-22212-2_25

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…[2] establishes, among other results, an upper bound of 17/3 on the pure price of anarchy of linear congestion games for a special case of the setting we study here.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 69%

“…Biló et al [2] also studied social context congestion games, in the case where the perceived cost of a player is the minimum, maximum, or sum of the immediate cost of his neighbors. [2] establishes, among other results, an upper bound of 17/3 on the pure price of anarchy of linear congestion games for a special case of the setting we study here.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Inefficiency of Games with Social Context

et al. 2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. The study of other-regarding player behavior such as altruism and spite in games has recently received quite some attention in the algorithmic game theory literature. Already for very simple models, it has been shown that altruistic behavior can actually be harmful for society in the sense that the price of anarchy may increase as the players become more altruistic. In this paper, we study the severity of this phenomenon for more realistic settings in which there is a complex underlying social structure, causing the players to direct their altruistic and spiteful behavior in a refined player-specific sense (depending, for example, on friendships that exist among the players). Our findings show that the increase in the price of anarchy is modest for congestion games and minsum scheduling games, whereas it is drastic for generalized second price auctions.

show abstract

“…[2] establishes, among other results, an upper bound of 17/3 on the pure price of anarchy of linear congestion games for a special case of the setting we study here.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 69%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inefficiency of Games with Social Context

et al. 2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Bilò et al [2013] study similar models that can in some cases be considered generalizations or variations of our altruism model. Their work provides bounds on the price of anarchy under these models, for linear congestion games (among other classes of games).…”

Section: Subsequent Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Altruism and Its Impact on the Price of Anarchy

Chen

Keijzer

Kempe

et al. 2014

ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for congestion games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1 − α i times his direct cost and α i times the social cost. Tuning the parameters α i allows smooth interpolation between purely selfish and purely altruistic behavior. Within this framework, we study primarily altruistic extensions of (atomic and nonatomic) congestion games, but also obtain some results on fair cost-sharing games and valid utility games.We derive (tight) bounds on the price of anarchy of these games for several solution concepts. Thereto, we suitably adapt the smoothness notion introduced by Roughgarden and show that it captures the essential properties to determine the robust price of anarchy of these games. Our bounds show that for atomic congestion games and cost-sharing games, the robust price of anarchy gets worse with increasing altruism, while for valid utility games, it remains constant and is not affected by altruism.However, the increase in the price of anarchy is not a universal phenomenon: For general nonatomic congestion games with uniform altruism, the price of anarchy improves with increasing altruism. For atomic and nonatomic symmetric singleton congestion games, we derive bounds on the pure price of anarchy that improve as the average level of altruism increases. (For atomic games, we only derive such bounds when cost functions are linear.) Since the bounds are also strictly lower than the robust price of anarchy, these games exhibit natural examples in which pure Nash equilibria are more efficient than more permissive notions of equilibrium.

show abstract

“…More recently, quite some attention has been given to more general settings in which the players do not necessarily behave entirely selfishly, but may alternatively exhibit spiteful or altruistic behavior; see, for instance, [4,6,7,10,12,14,19,[22][23][24]. Studying such alternative behaviors in games is motivated by the observation that altruism and spite are phenomena that frequently occur in real life (see, e.g., [20]).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Biló et al [4] also studied social context congestion games, in the case where the perceived cost of a player is the minimum, maximum, or sum of the immediate cost of his neighbors. They establish, among other results, an upper bound of 17/3 on the pure price of anarchy of linear congestion games for a special case of the setting we study here.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inefficiency of Games with Social Context

Anagnostopoulos

Becchetti

Keijzer

et al. 2013

Algorithmic Game Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The study of other-regarding player behavior such as altruism and spite in games has recently received quite some attention in the algorithmic game theory literature. Already for very simple models, it has been shown that altruistic behavior can actually be harmful for society in the sense that the price of anarchy may increase as the players become more altruistic. In this paper, we study the severity of this phenomenon for more realistic settings in which there is a complex underlying social structure, causing the players to direct their altruistic and spiteful behavior in a refined player-specific sense (depending, for example, on friendships that exist among the players). Our findings show that the increase in the price of anarchy is modest for congestion games and minsum scheduling games, whereas it might be drastic for generalized second price auctions.

show abstract

Social Context Congestion Games

Cited by 6 publications

References 20 publications

Inefficiency of Games with Social Context

Inefficiency of Games with Social Context

Altruism and Its Impact on the Price of Anarchy

Inefficiency of Games with Social Context

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About