2023
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-022-01089-6
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Social Distancing Network Creation

Abstract: During a pandemic people have to find a trade-off between meeting others and staying safely at home. While meeting others is pleasant, it also increases the risk of infection. We consider this dilemma by introducing a game-theoretic network creation model in which selfish agents can form bilateral connections. They benefit from network neighbors, but at the same time, they want to maximize their distance to all other agents. This models the inherent conflict that social distancing rules impose on the behavior … Show more

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“…These agents behave according to a threshold-based utility function that yields maximum utility if at least a certain fraction of same-type agents populate the neighborhood of the selected location. Game-theoretic variants of Schelling's model, called Schelling Games, have recently been studied [Chauhan et al, 2018;Echzell et al, 2019] and also variants became popular, where agents strive to maximize the fraction of same-type neighbors [Agarwal et al, 2021;Bullinger et al, 2021;Kanellopoulos et al, 2021;Bilò et al, 2022b;Kanellopoulos et al, 2022] or with singlepeaked preferences [Bilò et al, 2022a;Friedrich et al, 2023]. Schelling Games are different from our model since every resource, i.e., location, can only be chosen by at most one agent and thus the agent neighborhoods only partially overlap.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These agents behave according to a threshold-based utility function that yields maximum utility if at least a certain fraction of same-type agents populate the neighborhood of the selected location. Game-theoretic variants of Schelling's model, called Schelling Games, have recently been studied [Chauhan et al, 2018;Echzell et al, 2019] and also variants became popular, where agents strive to maximize the fraction of same-type neighbors [Agarwal et al, 2021;Bullinger et al, 2021;Kanellopoulos et al, 2021;Bilò et al, 2022b;Kanellopoulos et al, 2022] or with singlepeaked preferences [Bilò et al, 2022a;Friedrich et al, 2023]. Schelling Games are different from our model since every resource, i.e., location, can only be chosen by at most one agent and thus the agent neighborhoods only partially overlap.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%